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Abstract 
 Through a detailed case study of the Philippine-American War (1899-1902), 
this thesis presents a test of the bargaining model of war termination.  The study 
begins with a review of the war termination theory literature, tracing the currently 
dominant bargaining model’s development.  Also reviewed are theoretical challenges 
to the bargaining model drawn from constructivism, critical theory, organization 
theory, domestic politics and decision-making approaches, as well as political 
psychology.  Hypotheses derived from both the bargaining model and the alternative 
theoretical perspectives are tested against the empirical evidence of the case study.  
The findings of this study demonstrate that the bargaining model’s hypotheses and 
underlying assumptions are called into question.  Doubt cast on the bargaining model 
is found both in empirical disconfirmations of the model itself and in support for the 
model’s theoretical challengers.   
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Preface 
 The subject and purpose of this thesis have been greatly influenced by world 
events unfolding at the time of its writing.  Primarily, at this time in the fall of 2007, 
the United States and its allies are facing protracted war in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
Many in the US and elsewhere are calling for an end to the war.  Many are also 
asking:  will the war end? Meanwhile, policymakers in the US are asking: can we 
win?  This thesis has not been driven by the question of how the wars can be won, but 
rather how the current war in Iraq and Afghanistan, like past wars, may be brought to 
an end.  International ethics scholarship has already begun to address issues of jus 
post bellum prescribing the means by which war, including those in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, should be terminated.1  Unfortunately international relations scholarship 
has yet to provide clear answers regarding how wars are terminated and has not 
specifically considered war termination in the current Iraq and Afghan conflicts. My 
work will not directly address issues of war termination in the current wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.  Instead, this thesis looks at past wars in an effort to understand 
more generally how wars end.   
International relations scholar Fred Iklé has noted that “every war must end.”2  
Thus, the question to ask is not whether a war will end but how a war will end.  More 
specifically, the question to answer is what determines the end of a war and how 
belligerents may bring wars to conclusion.   The purpose of my thesis is to examine 
the processes by which wars end in order to contribute to both the scholarly and 
                                                     
1 See Brian Orend, “Justice after War,” Ethics & International Affairs 16.1 (2002): 43-56. 
2 Fred Ikle, Every War Must End. Rev. ed. (New York: Columbia UP, 1991). 
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policymaking discourse that has coalesced around this question: how do belligerents 
end their wars?  Perhaps a better understanding of how belligerents end their wars 
will compliment the work already done by international ethicists to explain 
normatively how belligerents should end their wars. 
 My examination of the processes by which wars end is guided by a subset of 
international relations scholarship known as war termination theory.  In the first 
chapter, I trace through past literature the development of war termination theory.  In 
the review of the war termination literature I delineate the theory’s explanations and 
predictions about how and when wars end.  I highlight the dominant school of 
thought in war termination theory: the bargaining model.  Then, using critiques from 
scholars of war termination as well as other theoretical orientations, I appraise the 
strengths and weaknesses of the bargaining model and assess the potential of my 
contribution to further the study of war termination.   
The second chapter sets out the framework for my study.  I describe the 
hypotheses to be tested, the methodology that is used, and introduce the case selected 
for study.  The criteria for case selection are described as is the justification for the 
case included in this thesis.  Chapter three contains a detailed case study, presenting 
an account of the selected war from the perspective of the bargaining model.  Chapter 
four offers alternative perspectives on the selected war based on theoretical critiques 
of the bargaining model.  Specifically in fourth chapter, the theoretical challenges to 
the bargaining model are used to test for weaknesses in the model.  Chapter five 
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concludes the thesis with a discussion of the findings of the case study chapters and 
the implications of these findings for the bargaining model.
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Chapter 1: War Termination Theory and Literature 
 War occurs “when political units abandon a nonviolent mode of interaction 
for a violent one” and war termination occurs “when they return to nonviolent 
interaction”.1  The political units engaged in the violent interaction that is war are 
known as belligerents.  In the war termination literature, belligerents are typically 
states.  Scholars studying this resumption of nonviolent interaction ending war have 
traced as far back as Carl von Clausewitz, Coleman Phillipson, and H.A. Calahan to 
indicate their pedigree.2  Despite the claim that war termination is a long-lived subject 
of study, war termination scholars generally bemoan a neglect of their subject 
especially when viewed in relation to the volume of study devoted to war initiation.3  
Michael I. Handel appears to dissent from this view and argues that the literature on 
war termination “is prodigious, if not overwhelming.”  However, Handel offers a 
qualification by explaining that war termination has often been poorly defined and 
thus, had been considered indistinguishable from peace studies and conflict 
                                                     
1 Paul Kecskemeti, “Political Rationality in Ending War.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 392 
(1970): 105-115. 
2 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War. Trans. James J. Graham. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Truebner & Co., 1908); Coleman 
Phillipson, Termination of War and Treaties of Peace. (London: Fisher Unwin, 1916); H.A. Calahan, What Makes War End? 
(New York: Vanguard, 1944); see also Kecskemeti, “Political Rationality in Ending War.”; Michael I. Handel, War Termination 
– A Critical Survey, (Jerusalem: Alpha Press, 1978); Sydney D. Bailey, “The United Nations and the Termination of Armed 
Conflict, 1946-64.” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 58.3 (1982): 465-475; Dan Reiter, 
“Exploring the Bargaining Model of War.” Perspectives on Politics 1.1(2003): 27-43.  
3 See for example Berenice A. Carroll, “War Termination and Conflict Theory.” Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Sciences 392 (1970): 14-29; Wallace J. Thies, “Searching for Peace: Vietnam and the Question of How Wars End.” 
Polity 7.3(1975): 304-333; Donald Wittman, “How Wars End: a Rational Model Approach.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 
23.4(1979): 743-763); Tansa G. Massoud, “War Termination.” Journal of Peace Research 33.4(1996): 491-496; H.E. Goemans, 
“Fighting for Survival: the Fate of Leaders and the Duration of War.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 44.5(2000): 555-579.  
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resolution.4   Handel also notes that war termination studies may generally be further 
distinguished by two approaches: broad and narrow.5  Broad approaches treat war as 
part of a long process without clear beginning or end points.  The narrow approach 
focuses on when and why a war ends and if the specific point of at which a war is 
terminated can be predicted.6 Literature pertaining to the narrow approach will be the 
subject of this chapter.7   
This chapter reviews the literature on the termination of interstate wars 
beginning with the 1960s as those years have been cited as the formative decade for 
war termination study as it is, more or less, now known.8  After a discussion of early 
works, I turn to the development of war termination theories and the growth of the 
currently dominant theory of war termination: the bargaining model.  
War Termination in the Nuclear Age  
Berenice A. Carroll has explained that in the 1960s the development of war 
termination research was delayed because conflict theorists and peace researchers, 
fearing nuclear war, were focused on avoiding wars through “deterrence and 
                                                     
4 Handel, War Termination – A Critical Survey. 9-10; see also Massoud, “War Termination.” 
5 Handel, 10-15.  Handel further divides the broad and narrow approaches into five groups of research.   The literature 
considered here deals with Handel’s fifth category: international relations studies of war termination.  
6 Handel, 10; see also Berenice A Carroll, “How Wars End: an Analysis of Some Current Hypotheses.” Journal of Peace 
Research 6.4(1969): 295-321; Massoud.  
7 I will not treat here the subject of terminating nuclear wars because such studies form a body of literature distinct from the war 
termination scholarship dealt with here. See for example Herman Kahn, “Issues of Thermonuclear War Termination.” Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science 392(1970): 133-172; Klaus Knorr, “Controlling Nuclear War.” 
International Security 9.4(1985): 79-98; Stephen J Cimbala and Joseph D. Douglass Jr., eds., Ending a Nuclear War: are the 
Superpowers Prepared? (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey, 1988); Stephen J. Cimbala, Nuclear Endings: Stopping War on Time. 
(New York: Praeger, 1989). 
8 Carroll, “How Wars End: an Analysis of Some Current Hypotheses”; Carroll, “War Termination and Conflict Theory”; 
Massoud. 
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pacification.”9  However, the occurrence of limited wars involving great powers 
demonstrates a need for research into terminating wars that did occur.10  The same 
fears of nuclear war that led theorists to seek means of preventing war motivated 
theorists to devise ways in which wars could be terminated before escalating to 
nuclear war.11  It is to these early theories that I now turn.     
The studies of Lewis A. Coser and Frank L. Klingberg have been credited 
with helping to open the study of war termination in the 1960s.12  Klingberg posits 
that certain levels of casualties in battle and losses in relation to total population 
would lead to war termination.13  However, Carroll labels his work a failure and faults 
Klingberg’s study, and others before it, for treating the course of war as 
predetermined and without strategizing or calculating by the belligerents, ending only 
at a certain point of losses and deprivation for the defeated belligerent.14   
Coser theorizes that war is a means of measuring the relative power - and thus 
relative bargaining position in negotiations - of the belligerents and that certain 
symbolic military outcomes, such as the seizure of one belligerent’s capital city, 
would indicate to that belligerent that they had lost the war and must therefore accept 
                                                     
9 Carroll, “War Termination”; see also Thies, “Searching for Peace: Vietnam and the Question of How Wars End.” 
10 Carroll, “War Termination”; see also William Fox, “The Causes of Peace and Conditions of War.” Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 392(1970): 1-13. 
11 Carroll, “War Termination,” 17. 
12 Lewis A. Coser, “The Termination of Conflict.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 5.4(1961): 347-353; Frank L. Klingberg, 
“Predicting the Termination of War: Battle Casualties and Population Losses.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 10.2(1966): 
129-171; Carroll, “How Wars”; Carroll, “War Termination.”  
13 Klingberg, “Predicting the Termination of War: Battle Casualties and Population Losses.” 
14 Carroll, “How Wars,” 301; Carroll, “War Termination,” 19-20. 
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defeat.15  Carroll notes Coser’s conception of war termination as part of a negotiated 
compromise or bargain, but criticizes Coser and scholars such as Klingberg for 
treating war termination as resulting in a clear “winner-loser, victory-defeat” 
relationship between belligerents.16   
It Takes Two to Terminate 
During the remainder of the 1960s, concerns over a “protracted series of 
‘local’ wars with great power involvement” grew and scholars begin to add on to the 
works produced earlier in the decade.17  In 1970, “How Wars End,” a special issue of 
the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, addresses these 
contributions, clarifies what knowledge had been generated, and offers suggestions 
for future studies.   
Negotiation and the Termination of War 
Whereas Coser notes that, though it takes negotiation between both sides to 
terminate a war, the responsibility for making peace lay with the defeated side, the 
scholars writing for this special issue recognize that, except for situations in which 
one belligerent side stops fighting or surrenders unconditionally, war termination 
requires an agreement by both sides to end the war.18  Thus, war termination began to 
be seen as the outcome of negotiations that took place during the fighting between 
                                                     
15 Coser, “The Termination of Conflict.” 
16 Carroll, “How Wars,” 306-307; see also Thies. 
17 Carroll, “War Termination”; see also Fox, “The Causes of Peace and Conditions of War.” 
18 Coser; Fox, 5; Morton H. Halperin, “War Termination as a Problem in Civil-Military Relations.” Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 392(1970): 86-95; Kecskemeti, 107. 
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belligerent sides.19  Paul Kecskemeti refines Coser’s concept of war as a means to 
measure relative power by explicitly stating that war results from the failure of 
nonviolent bargaining between rational political units and that war serves to modify 
or clarify the “bargaining strength relationship between the parties.”20  Furthermore, 
bargaining positions are not only determined by the revelation of relative power 
through military outcomes but also by the belligerents’ calculations of the probable 
costs of continued conflict as well as the calculation of “the political stake” or “the 
magnitude of the political gains and losses accruing to the opponents in case of an 
asymmetrical outcome (i.e. relative victory or defeat).”21  William T.R. Fox, 
Kecskemeti, and George H. Quester also contribute the idea that trust and perceived 
durability of any settlement terms are important in negotiations for war termination.22 
The Advent of the ‘Rational Models’ 
Kecskemeti’s attribution of rationality to the belligerents in a war is 
important.23 However, Quester, writing for the same special issue, treats war and war 
termination negotiation as a Prisoners’ Dilemma game, and therefore also assumes 
rational actors.  Quester argues that wars continue because each belligerent side 
underestimates “the other’s desire for peace.”  Underestimation of the other side’s 
“desire for peace” results from misinterpretation of the settlement terms offered 
which, in turn can be the result of one belligerent overestimating “the clarity of their 
                                                     
19 Fox. 
20 Kecskemeti, 106. 
21 Ibid., 107-109. 
22 Fox, 9-13; Kecskemeti; George H. Quester, “Wars Prolonged by Misunderstood Signals.” Annals of the American Academy 
of Social Science 392(1970): 30-39. 
23 Kecskemeti. 
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own signals” or intentionally misinterpreting offered terms for such reasons as hoping 
to elicit lowered demands from the opposing belligerent.24   
Critiques of Early ‘Rational Models’ 
Carroll also points to prior works based on the assumption of rationality and 
the Prisoners’ Dilemma.  Carroll notes the arrival in the late 1960s of “gamelike” 
theories based on concepts such as the Prisoners’ Dilemma.   She notes that these 
“gamelike” theories grew out of conflict theories and are thus flawed in their 
applicability to war termination by the assumption in the ‘games’ that both 
belligerents share, as their most important interest, an interest ending the war.  Carroll 
faults the early game theories for treating conflict only as a behavior while failing to 
consider “what the conflict (war) is about.”25  Additionally, the game theories derived 
from conflict theory assumed that belligerents’ war fighting capabilities were 
symmetrical.26  Making matters worse, Carroll criticizes some early rational models 
for being “too static” in that the models did not adequately address communication 
between belligerents or the belligerents’ abilities to appraise the probabilities of 
future outcomes from continued battle.  Carroll offers a new formula that could 
account for changes resulting from updated beliefs or communication between 
                                                     
24 Quester, “Wars Prolonged by Misunderstood Signals,” 32-36; see also Fred C. Ikle, Every War Must End. (New York: 
Columbia UP, 1991), Ch. 5. 
25 Carroll “War Termination,” 21-25; see also Thies.  It appears that Quester’s work might be subject to this criticism as he too 
assumes that both belligerents desire peace and that war termination fails to occur because each side underestimates the level of 
this desire in their enemy.  However, Quester does note on page 36 that some wars may be fought over intractable issues, which 
suggests that peace may not always be an actor’s first preference. 
26 Carroll, “War Termination,” 25-27. 
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belligerents, but notes that even improved formulae cannot completely overcome the 
difficulty of rational models because of difficulty in measuring variables.27 
Morton H. Halperin, also writing in the special issue, points out a further 
potential weakness in rationality based models of war termination.  Halperin, writing 
from the perspective of the bureaucratic politics literature, argues that any agreement 
to terminate war between two belligerents will also rely on war termination being 
agreed upon within the government of each belligerent.  Military interests vary 
among three levels in the military bureaucracy: field commanders who are likely to 
see success as possible if only they are given the resources required to win; senior 
military officers in each service (i.e. army or navy) who, being concerned with 
maintaining their budget and autonomy, will compete with other services; the general 
staff who mediate between military interests and those of civilian political leaders.   
Civilian leaders’ interests will be concerned with domestic constraints such as public 
opinion and electoral success; civilian diplomats will be concerned with the effect of 
settlement terms on post-war diplomacy.   Based on the different and often 
contradictory interests among intra-government organizations, war termination 
requires a group “strongly committed” to terminating the war. 28  Halperin notes that 
the crucial group may be the general staff due to the role they play as mediator 
between military and civilian interests as well as the support they are able to provide 
to civilian leaders advocating war termination.  Realizing that the government of each 
                                                     
27 Carroll, “How Wars,” 307-316.  
28 Halperin, “War Termination as a Problem of Civil-Military Relations,” 87; see also Handel; Ikle, Every War Must End, Ch. 
4-5. 
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belligerent may be far from unitary casts some doubt upon theories assuming that the 
belligerents are capable of rational calculations and actions.29 
 As a general appraisal of the above works, Carroll’s words are again 
instructive.  Carroll states that for any rationality based models (or theories in 
general) to be more than “essentially speculative,” historical research is needed to 
provide data.  As a concluding statement, Carroll describes the field of war 
termination theory as “new and undeveloped” and “far from providing us with sound 
guidance toward policies.”30 
Growth, Refinement, and Continued Interest Arising from Limited Wars 
 The persistence of limited wars in the 1970s spurs continued interest in war 
termination.31  Scholars further refine rational choice models to account for expected 
future values as well as communication and negotiation between belligerents.32 Yet, 
despite the growth of war termination studies ranging from game theory to historical 
case studies, complaints of neglect and the failure of scholars to relate their work to 
that of other scholars continued.33  During this time, concerns about the unitary 
rational actors assumed by rational choice models of war termination are also 
voiced.34   
                                                     
29 Halperin, 87-95. 
30 Carroll, “How Wars,” 313-316; Carroll, “War Termination,” 29. 
31 Thies; Handel; Bailey, “The United Nations and the Termination of Armed Conflict, 1946-64.” 
32 Wittman, “How a War Ends: a Rational Model Approach.” 
33 Thies, 304-406; Handel, 11; Wittman, 750. 
34 Handel; C.R. Mitchell and Michael Nicholson, “Rational Models and the Ending of Wars.” The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 27.3(1983): 495-520. 
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Michael I. Handel, voicing such concerns, argues the need for war termination 
theories to take into account the three levels of analysis present in international 
relations theories: the international system, domestic politics, and the role of 
individual leaders. Handel points out, at the international level of analysis, the 
dominance of rational choice models in theorists’ efforts to explain belligerents’ 
interactions and notes the reliance of those models on assumptions of unitary rational 
decision-making belligerents (or states). 35  Handel, along with C.R. Mitchell and 
Michael Nicholson, highlights domestic politics as a challenge to rational choice 
models by echoing many of Halperin’s arguments about the role of competing 
interests within the governments of the belligerents and again emphasizes that 
competing interests within belligerents may delay war termination.36  Handel adds 
that public opinion in democracies may exert pressures to shorten war while 
authoritarian regimes may be insulated from such pressures.  Also noted is the need to 
understand the role of domestic stability/instability in war termination decisions.37   
Handel further argues that the decisions of individual leaders matter and theories 
assuming belligerent states to be unitary rational actors making cost/benefit 
                                                     
35 Handel, 28-30. In addition, and similar to others discussed above, Handel points out as challenges to rational models of war 
termination problems such as difficulty in finding measurements for variables and the inability of either belligerent to have “all 
the necessary information” for calculating relative power. 
36 Handel, 38-39.  Mitchell and Nicholson.  As an example of non-unitary belligerent actors, Mitchell and Nicholson use the 
case of the Boer Wars to illustrate how allied belligerents may hold different preference orderings and thus possess different 
levels of willingness to settle a war on a given set of terms. 
37 Handel, 22-27; Mitchell and Nicholson, “Rational Models and the Ending of Wars.”  Handel concludes that domestic level 
factors have not been studied systematically and are not ready for integration into a general theory of war termination. 
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calculations should be tempered with considerations of “non-rational elements” in 
individuals’ decision making.38      
In spite of doubts in rational choice models, Handel argues that such models 
are “indispensable” when applied to the bargaining process and that bargaining theory 
is, in turn, a “great help” for understanding war termination negotiations.39 
Contemporary with Handel’s argument, Wallace J. Thies makes an early, direct call 
for the use of a bargaining approach to war termination.40  Thies argues for a 
bargaining approach that treats war termination as the result of decisions based on 
settlement terms, anticipated costs of continued fighting, current and projected 
battlefield situation, and beliefs about the other belligerent’s resolve.41  The work of 
Handel, Nicholson, Mitchell, and Thies allows one to see war as a bargaining process 
and to conceive of the bargaining process dynamics at each level of analysis. In 
addition, the open and direct advocacy of Thies and Handel for studying war 
termination through a bargaining approach marks a crucial point in the development 
of war termination theory: the advent of the bargaining model. 
The Development of the Bargaining Approach to War Termination Studies 
 Paul R. Pillar’s Negotiating Peace has been recognized as the pioneering 
study of war termination (and war) as a bargaining process.42  Pillar contributes 
                                                     
38 Handel, 15-21.  Using as examples US President Woodrow Wilson and German dictator Adolph Hitler, Handel shows both 
that individual leaders matter and that those individual leaders can be influenced by “non-rational elements.” 
39 Handel, 38-39. 
40 However, elements of suggestions for a bargaining approach can be discerned as early as Coser and Fox 
41 Thies, 307-311. 
42 Paul R. Pillar, Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process. (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1983); see Branislav 
L. Slantchev, “How Initiators End Their Wars: the Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace.” American Journal of Political 
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findings and ideas which have become enshrined in the bargaining approach to war 
termination.  First, Pillar points out that negotiations occur while the war continues, 
but that negotiations may be delayed until the military outcomes of battles have made 
the likely outcome of the war more predictable.  Second, and a related point, Pillar 
argues that military outcomes during the war reveal private information (information 
not known prior to war) about each belligerent’s relative capabilities to fight a war.   
The revelation of relative war-fighting capabilities affects the strength of each 
belligerent’s bargaining positions in peace (war termination) negotiations.  
Importantly, Pillar also notes that offers to negotiate and offers of concessions may 
convey to the enemy side an impression of weakness.  Regardless of the fact that 
advocacy for a bargaining approach can be found in earlier works, it appears that 
Pillar’s research marked a watershed moment for the development of bargaining 
models and approaches.43 
Afterwards, scholars begin to focus on the settlement terms between 
belligerents involved in negotiated termination of war.44  Two perspectives are 
offered on the origin of settlement terms.45  One perspective treats settlement terms 
                                                                                                                                                       
Science 48.4(2004): 813-829.  However, Carl von Clausewitz, Geoffrey Blainey, and others have sometimes been credited with 
conceptualizing war as a bargaining process. See for example R.H. Wagner, “Bargaining and War.” American Journal of 
Political Science 44.3(2000): 469-484; Dan Reiter, “Exploring the Bargaining Model of War.” Perspectives on Politics 
1.1(2003): 27-43.  It should also be noted that Fox and Kecskemeti, and even Coser, offered some ideas similar to those for 
which Pillar is given so much credit.  This failure to effectively link war termination scholarship and build upon earlier works 
conjures up Handel’s complaints that war termination scholars have failed to connect their works to those of others. 
43 Pillar, Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process, Ch. 2-4. 
44 Massoud 1996; Suzanne Werner, “Negotiating the Terms of Settlement: War Aims and Bargaining Leverage.” The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 42.3(1998): 321-343.   Werner on page 322 defines settlement terms as the “explicit and implicit agreements 
that arise or exist as consequence of the war’s ending.” 
45 Werner, “Negotiating the Terms of Settlement: War Aims and Bargaining Leverage,” 322. 
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simply as the original war aims of the belligerents, in other words, settlement terms 
are “exogenous to the conflict.”46  Exogenous settlement terms appear to be 
characteristic of early rational models of war termination.47   The other perspective - 
and the perspective adopted by bargaining approaches - holds that settlement terms 
are formed during war termination negotiations and, thus “endogenous” to the 
conflict.48  In sum, “original aims and the bargaining leverage of the belligerents” 
affect each other as negotiations for war termination progress to produce the final 
settlement terms.49 
 The bargaining leverage or “the ability to demand more favorable terms,” 
which bargaining approaches purport to shape the settlement terms between 
belligerent sides derives from multiple sources which can generally be thought of in 
two categories: military capabilities and resolve.50  First, military capabilities are the 
ability to impose costs on the enemy and serve as a source of bargaining leverage.51  
Battles fought between the belligerents serve the purpose of revealing the relative 
military capabilities of each side and clarify each belligerent’s ability to impose costs 
on the other.52 
                                                     
46 Werner, 322; Slantchev “How Initiators End Their Wars: The Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace,” 813. 
47 See for example Carroll, “How Wars.” 
48 Werner, 322; see also Slantchev, “How Initiators.” 
49 Werner, 322; see also Slantchev, “How Initiators.” 
50 Werner, 328; see also Wagner, “Bargaining and War”; H.E. Goemans, “War and Punishment”: the Causes of War 
Termination and the First World War. (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2000); Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner, “A Bargaining 
Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and Outcome of War.” American Journal of Political Science 
46.4(2002): 819-837; Reiter; Slantchev, “How Initiators.” 
51 Werner; Wagner; Reiter; Slantchev, “How Initiators.” 
52 Wagner; Filson and Werner, “A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and Outcome of 
War”; Reiter, “Exploring the Bargaining Model of War”; Slantchev, “How Initiators.” 
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 The second source of bargaining leverage is resolve, defined as the preference 
of one belligerent for continued war over the terms of settlement offered by the other 
belligerent.53  Branislav Slantchev posits that resolve may be an artifact of a 
belligerent’s belief, based on observable capabilities, that there is parity between 
itself and its opponent (or that it at least possesses the forces necessary to justify its 
proposed settlement terms).54  However, resolve may also be influenced by factors 
other than a belligerent’s beliefs about its military capabilities relative to those of its 
adversary.  
Several scholars note that resolve may reflect the stakes for which a 
belligerent goes to war.  Stakes may be defined as “the magnitude of the political 
gains and losses accruing to the opponents in case of an asymmetrical outcome (i.e. 
relative victory or defeat).”55  In some cases, a belligerent may be at war over an issue 
of little saliency such as an isolated punitive war against a weaker belligerent. Other 
wars may involve both belligerent sides fighting “over territory or state integrity” and 
may therefore be more salient to the belligerents.  Still other wars may involve a 
belligerent whose “national existence is at stake.”  According to this line of thought, 
the belligerent for whom the issue of the war is of lower salience has less at stake in 
the war.  The less is at stake, the lower is the payoff of victory and thus, greater are 
the incentives for the belligerent to end the war early.  As a result, the belligerent may 
                                                     
53 Wagner; Filson and Werner, “A Bargaining Model.” 
54 Filson and Werner “A Bargaining”; Slantchev, “The Principle”;  “How Initiators”.  It is important to note that the term 
“belief” in bargaining model theory is treated as a rational calculation or assessment based on available information.  Thus, the 
term “belief” is distinct from the term “belief” or  “perception” as used in other approaches such as cognitive psychology. 
55 Paul Kecskemeti, “Political Rationality in Ending War.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 
392(1970): 105-115. 
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be willing to accept less favorable settlement terms in order to end the war.  On the 
other hand, the more salient the issue to a belligerent, the higher is the payoff of 
victory and the lower the incentives to end the war soon.   Thus, when the issue is 
more salient to a belligerent and the stakes of the war are higher, a belligerent will 
have a higher level of resolve and “fight longer, even under worse circumstances.”56   
  Resolve can be influenced by domestic political issues.57  The government 
and leaders of a belligerent state may be eager or hesitant to terminate a war 
depending on the opinion of the leadership’s constituency.58  Public opinion has been 
identified by numerous scholars as an important factor for democratic belligerents.  
Democratic belligerents are more sensitive to the costs of war because their publics 
tend to be less tolerant of battlefield losses (i.e. body counts and expended funds).  A 
well known example is the body-bag hypothesis which suggests that public opinion 
will turn against wars as the belligerent’s casualty counts increase.59   Due to cost 
sensitivity, democratic belligerents are claimed ceteris paribus to have weaker 
resolve than non-democratic belligerents.  Furthermore, the efforts of democratic 
                                                     
56 Kecskemeti, 109; Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict.” World Politics 
27.2(1975): 175-200; Slantchev, “How Initiators,” 817.  Notably, Kecskemeti points out that the stakes of a war may fluctuate 
during the course of the conflict but bargaining model theorists have thus far not included stake fluctuation in their models of 
war termination.    
57 Werner; H.E. Goemans, “Fighting for Survival: the Fate of Leaders and the Duration of War.” The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 44.5(2000): 555-579; H.E. Goemans, “War and Punishment”: the Causes of War Termination and the First World 
War; Wagner; Reiter; Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner, “Bargaining and Fighting: The Impact of Regime Type on War Onset, 
Duration, and Outcomes.” American Journal of Political Science 48.2(2004): 296-313;  Bahar Leventoğlu and Branislav 
Slantchev, “The Armed Peace: A Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of War.” American Journal of Political Science 51.4(2007): 
755-771. 
58 Werner; Reiter; Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner, “Bargaining and Fighting: The Impact of Regime Type on War Onset, 
Duration, and Outcomes;” Bahar Leventoğlu and Branislav Slantchev, “The Armed Peace: A Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of 
War.”  
59 See for example John E. Mueller, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion. (New York: Wiley, 1973). 
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belligerents to exhibit resolve may be less credible compared to the effort non-
democratic belligerents.  In sum, sensitivity to the costs of war and the tendency 
toward weaker resolve are suggested to lead democratic belligerents to avoid 
prolonging war by accepting less favorable terms of settlement.60   
A belligerent’s regime type may also influence leaders’ negotiations for war 
termination by affecting the costs of settlement faced directly by the leaders.61  For 
example, H.E. Goemans argues that leaders negotiating the end of a war consider the 
potential loss of power as well as other penalties such as exile or death that may 
result.  As a more specific instance, leaders of regimes which exclude much of the 
populace from access to the policy process and use moderate repression are more 
likely to experience severe penalties from even minor defeat in war and therefore, 
ceteris paribus will prolong a losing war and “gamble for resurrection” rather than 
end a war on moderately unfavorable terms of settlement. 62  Thus, a belligerent state 
led by a ruler fearing harsh penalties from losing a war may exhibit a high level of 
resolve.  Having discussed settlement terms and the means by which belligerents’ 
original war aims are affected by the bargaining leverage each belligerent side brings 
to the negotiating table, it is now necessary to explain the bargaining model within 
which war aims, bargaining leverage, and original aims interact. 
                                                     
60 Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict.”; Goemans, “Fighting for 
Survival: the Fate of Leaders and the Duration of War”; Goemans, “War and Punishment”; Ivan Arreguin-Toft, “How the Weak 
Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict.” International Security 26.1(2001): 93-128; Filson and Werner, “A Bargaining”; 
Reiter; Filson and Werner “Bargaining and Fighting.”;  Leventoğlu and Slantchev, 769. 
61 Goemans, “Fighting for Survival: the Fate of Leaders and the Duration of War”; Goemans, “War and Punishment”; Filson 
and Werner, “Bargaining and Fighting”; Reiter. 
62 Goemans, “War and Punishment,”; Goemans, “Fighting for Survival,” 577. 
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 Bargaining approaches characteristic of recent studies have relied on formal, 
mathematical modeling.63 However, generalizing the essence of the bargaining model 
can be accomplished in non-formal terms.  According to the bargaining model of war 
termination, war begins when states turn to warfare to reach settlement of an issue or 
issues under dispute.64  At the onset of war each belligerent possesses information 
about its opponent and also possesses information about its own military capabilities 
and resolve that is unknown (or private) to the other belligerent.65  This private 
information about relative military capabilities and resolve is revealed over the course 
of the war through both battle and negotiation outcomes.66   
Negotiations reveal the relative resolve of the belligerents and may also reveal 
the relative strength of the belligerents.67  For instance, one belligerent’s rejection of 
the settlement terms offered by the other may indicate a strong resolve of the rejecting 
side.68   Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner point out that a rejection of settlement 
terms by one belligerent may also indicate to the other belligerent that their opponent 
has strong military capabilities with which to compliment their strong resolve.69  
However, Slantchev argues that negotiations are subject to strategic behavior and 
thus, “highly manipulable.”  According to Slantchev’s argument, belligerent A may 
                                                     
63 Werner; Wagner; Filson and Werner “A Bargaining”; Reiter 2003; Slantchev, “How Initiators.” 
64 Reiter. 
65 Goemans, “Fighting for Survival”; Goemans, “War and Punishment”; Wagner 2000; Filson and Werner, “A Bargaining”; 
Reiter; Slantchev, “How Initiators.” 
66  Goemans, “Fighting for Survival”; Goemans, “War and Punishment”; Wagner 2000; Filson and Werner, “A Bargaining”; 
Reiter; Branislav Slantchev, “The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations.” American Political Science Review 
97.4(2003): 621-632;  Slantchev, “How Initiators End Their Wars.”. 
67 Filson and Werner “A Bargaining”; Branislav Slantchev, “The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations.”  
68 Ibid.   
69 Filson and Werner, “A Bargaining.” 
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reject terms offered by belligerent B or deliberately offer unacceptable terms to 
belligerent B in order to signal strong military capabilities, whether or not the strength 
signaled by belligerent A is reflected in actual military capabilities. However, because 
the “fog of war” makes battle information “noisy” Slantchev claims that negotiations 
remain an important source of information.70   
Battle between belligerent sides reveals the true balance of military 
capabilities through victory, defeat, or stalemate between the opposing sides.71  In 
contrast to the high manipulability of negotiation, information from battle is non-
manipulable (though battlefield information may be garbled by the “fog of war”).72  
In other words, belligerent A may manipulate belligerent B’s beliefs about belligerent 
A’s capabilities by rejecting settlement terms offered by belligerent B.  However, if 
belligerent A loses a series of battles to belligerent B, then belligerent A cannot 
manipulate the information obtained by belligerent B about belligerent A’s military 
capabilities.  Slantchev states that absolute loss (i.e. casualties, destroyed materiel, 
etc.) levels may not be an accurate indicator of battlefield success or failure.  Instead, 
belligerents will base their assessment of battle outcomes on their rate of loss relative 
to that of the opposing belligerent.73  In other words, belligerents will not simply look 
at their own ‘butcher’s bill’ in judging battle outcomes, but will also compare their 
own losses to those inflicted on their adversary.  Importantly, a belligerent with 
                                                     
70 Slantchev, “The Principle,” 624, 627,  628. 
71 Goemans, “Fighting for Survival”; Goemans, “War and Punishment”; Wagner 2000; Filson and Werner, “A Bargaining”; 
Reiter; Slantchev, “How Initiators.” 
72 Slantchev, “The Principle,” 624; Slantchev, “How Initiators,” 817. 
73 Slantchev, “How Initiators,” 817. 
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greater reserves (than its adversary) may be slower to utilize battlefield information to 
update its beliefs about the military capabilities of its opponent.  However, relative 
loss rates are argued to have significantly more weight in belligerents’ calculations 
than relative reserve levels.74 
It is important to note that while information derived from battle outcomes is 
non-manipulable, belligerents can manipulate their military capabilities during the 
course of a war.  A belligerent may adopt innovations such as new military 
technology or altered military strategies.  Such innovations may make a belligerent’s 
military capabilities stronger than they were at the outset of the war.75  For example, 
Ivan Arreguin-Toft argues that adopting a strategy of guerrilla warfare (i.e. hit and 
run ambushes) allows a weaker belligerent to enhance its limited military capabilities 
and extract more favorable settlement terms from a much stronger belligerent using 
conventional warfare strategies (i.e. taking, holding, and fortifying territory).  
However, if the stronger belligerent adapts to the guerrilla warfare strategies of the 
weaker belligerent by adopting a strategy of “barbarism” (i.e. using forced 
concentration of the population, torture, or summary execution), then the stronger 
belligerent can minimize the effectiveness of guerrilla warfare and impose harsher 
terms on the weaker belligerent.76  In short, battle between belligerents reveals non-
                                                     
74 Ibid., 817, 824. 
75 Reiter, 34-35; Slantchev, “The Principle,” 629. 
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manipulable information about their relative capabilities but, over the course of the 
war, belligerents may manipulate the strategies they employ on the battlefield in ways 
that increase their capabilities. 
According to bargaining model theorists, the information revealed during 
negotiations and battle (even considering the effects of reserves on belief updating 
and the possibilities for innovation) is more accurate than information held prior to 
the onset of war and negotiations.77  Information revealed during fighting and 
negotiation reduces the uncertainty belligerents have regarding one another’s relative 
capabilities and resolve.78  Reduced uncertainty allows the belligerent sides to 
effectively and accurately update their beliefs about the other’s relative capabilities 
and resolve.79 Uncertainty is continually reduced over the course of the war and the 
war will be terminated when belligerents’ updated beliefs about relative power and 
resolve “converge sufficiently” for mutually acceptable terms to be made.80  An 
important aspect of the bargaining model’s propositions is that the belligerents’ 
beliefs do not have to converge on which belligerent will win.  Instead, belligerents’ 
beliefs must only converge in terms of “their expectations about what each is 
prepared to concede” based on “the relative likelihood of various outcomes” resulting 
                                                                                                                                                       
Such depredations, which can also include strategic bombing of non-military targets and “reprisals against noncombatants” are 
intended “to destroy an adversary’s will and capacity to fight.” 
77 Goemans, “Fighting for Survival”; Goemans, “War and Punishment”; Wagner 2000; Filson and Werner, “A Bargaining”; 
Reiter; Slantchev, “The Principle”; Slantchev, “How Initiators, see especially 817.” 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Filson and Werner, “A Bargaining,” 832; Slantchev, “The Principle”; Slantchev, “How Initiators,” 815; see also Goemans, 
“Fighting for Survival”; Goemans, “War and Punishment”; Wagner; Reiter. 
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from continued fighting.81 In sum, acceptable settlement terms are the condition 
necessary for war termination and those settlement terms reflect the revealed relative 
balance of power and resolve between the belligerent sides.82  
Conclusion: Confidence and Caution for the Future of the Bargaining Approach 
New Cause for Confidence  
Supporters of “endogenous war termination theory,” or the bargaining model 
approach, have claimed that it “is a worthwhile research agenda that deserves further 
scrutiny.”83  Indeed, the bargaining model is currently the dominant approach to 
theories of war termination.  The bargaining model also appears to have claims to 
merit other than its recent dominance.  Unlike the rational models Carroll criticized, 
the bargaining model includes communication between belligerents and the ability for 
belligerents’ assessments of future prospects to be updated during the war.84  
Bargaining model proponents have also taken strides to incorporate some domestic 
level influences into their theories.85  Additionally, by translating domestic level 
influences into costs for the leaders and decision-makers in the war and negotiations, 
bargaining model theorists have worked to meet Handel’s call for integration of the 
domestic and individual levels of analyses into war termination theories.86   
Furthermore, proponents of the bargaining model have overcome the problem of 
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assuming that a terminated war must result in a ‘winner’ and a ‘loser’ by illustrating 
that settlement terms represent a convergence of beliefs between belligerent sides 
about relative capabilities and expected outcomes of continued warfare.87  Lastly, 
Slantchev has argued that the bargaining model has “progressed sufficiently to 
generate testable hypotheses” and thus has moved the field beyond Carroll’s appraisal 
that war termination theory was “essentially speculative.”88 
Major Critiques and Hermeneutic Challenges  
Despite the strengths of the bargaining approach to war termination theory, 
weaknesses and challenges still persist.  While supporters of the bargaining model 
have worked to incorporate domestic and individual level variables, Dan Reiter 
argues that in addition to a need to further address domestic political influences, 
challenges to the bargaining approach are posed by constructivist approaches, 
cognitive-psychological theory, and organization theory.89  These challenges question 
the core assumptions of the bargaining model and its predictions about the 
mechanisms by which wars are terminated.  If correct, domestic politics approaches, 
constructivism, cognitive-psychological theory, and organization theory may 
undermine the theoretical foundations of the bargaining model. 
Challenges from Constructivism and Critical Theory 
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Constructivist approaches and critical theory offer perspectives that challenge 
the rationalist underpinnings of the bargaining model.  Reiter points out that 
constructivism, which emphasizes the role of “intersubjective social factors in 
determining critical phenomena such as identity and interests, claims that war is best 
understood as a social convention determined and shaped by norms and culture, not 
as a rationalist choice reflecting costs and benefits.”90  Similarly, Friedrich 
Kratochwil warns against “mistaking capabilities for power” and argues that power is 
not a possession independent of the social context in which it is wielded.  Hence, 
Kratochwil doubts the use of rationalist techniques such as using “marginal utility 
calculations derived from body counts” to predict a war’s outcome.91 In line with 
Kratochwil’s doubts about the usefulness of applying rationalist assumptions to war 
termination studies, the constructivist approach suggests that what a belligerent 
believes to be acceptable settlement terms will not just be based upon calculations of 
the probable outcomes of continued battle.  Instead, what terms are perceived to be 
acceptable may be shaped by “the practice of violence” which may lead belligerents 
to demand harsher settlement terms from an enemy perceived to be “an intractably 
hostile barbarian.”92   
However, “the practice of violence” over the course of a war may not be 
necessary for a belligerent to perceive its opponent as “an intractably hostile 
                                                     
90 Reiter, 36. 
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barbarian.”93 David Campbell argues that in order to justify the existence of states and 
hence state governments, the governments of states foster national identities in terms 
of a self-other conception.94  The identity of a national ‘self’ is dependent on treating 
foreign ‘others’ as inherently threatening.  Campbell notes that this is done by casting 
the self identity of a nation as “healthy” and “civilized” while portraying a foreign 
other as “sick” or a barbarian standing “in opposition to the ‘civilized’ self.”  In 
Campbell’s argument, the “conduct of war” is shaped by the dichotomies of self-
other, health-disease, civilization-barbarism.  The dichotomous conceptions of 
identity remove gray areas around the meaning of a foreign other’s threatening 
actions and likewise any doubts that war is the appropriate response.  Thus, war may 
serve the purpose of generating the self identity of a belligerent through conflict with 
a belligerent other and continued war may have some intrinsic value as a force to 
further reify self identity.95  During wars, belligerent states’ leaders may mobilize 
domestic support for continued war by emphasizing dichotomous identities of self 
and other. 
Critiques from Psychological Theory 
                                                     
93 Ibid. 
94 David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity. Rev. ed. (Minneapolis: 
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Psychological theory offers a critique of the bargaining model that shares 
some commonalities with the critique from critical theory and the constructivist 
approach.  However, important differences exist between constructivism/critical 
theory and psychological theory in both assumptions regarding underlying 
mechanisms and explanations of political behavior.  Constructivism and critical 
theory emphasize “intersubjective social factors” such as culture and norms and 
therefore focuses on the groups of actors among which intersubjective understandings 
are formed and shared.96  Psychological theory (especially cognitive psychology), on 
the other hand, focuses more on the mental processes and biases of individual actors 
and decision-makers.97  According to psychological approaches to international 
relations and particularly foreign policy analysis, the mental processes and cognitive 
biases of policymakers lead to decisions and behaviors that are not well explained by 
rational choice theory (upon which the bargaining model of war termination is 
built).98 
Cognitive-psychological approaches to foreign policy analysis generally 
assume that individuals are “more receptive to information that is consistent with 
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their prior beliefs than to information that runs counter to those beliefs.”99   
Furthermore, beliefs may not quickly converge with new information, because 
individuals stop searching for information once they have sufficient knowledge to 
support prior beliefs.  Additionally, individuals’ beliefs are resistant to change even in 
the face of disconfirming evidence. 100  Therefore, cognitive-psychology challenges 
the bargaining model assumption that belligerents’ beliefs converge with new 
information received during war.101  In turn, cognitive-psychology offers explanations 
and predictions about war termination running counter to those of the bargaining 
model.   
 Cognitive biases are argued to cause decision-makers to suffer 
misperceptions.  The class of cognitive biases known as attribution errors will be 
discussed first, followed by a description of other cognitive biases.  Among 
attribution errors, dispositional, fundamental, and situational attributions are claimed 
to be particularly important in international conflict.102   In the case of dispositional 
attribution errors, decision-makers perceive that an opposing belligerent’s disposition 
is inherently aggressive or hostile.    Similarly, fundamental attribution errors lead 
decision-makers to “interpret others' undesirable behavior in terms of dispositional 
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factors, as opposed to environmental constraints.”103  Scholars applying cognitive-
psychology to foreign policy claim that in international conflict, dispositional and 
fundamental attribution errors may be compounded by situational attribution errors.  
On one hand, a belligerent’s decision-makers will likely perceive that their own 
refusal to concede to an adversary’s settlement terms is due to external 
circumstances.104 For example, decision-makers may argue that they cannot concede 
because the concessions would diminish their long term security.  On the other hand, 
if belligerent A’s opponent behaves in a conciliatory manner, belligerent A’s 
decision-makers will likely perceive the opponent’s conciliation to be a result of 
belligerent A’s resolve rather than a change in the adversary’s disposition.105   
 According to cognitive-psychological approaches to foreign policy analysis, 
the above attribution errors “can lead to missed opportunities for conflict 
resolution.”106  In terms of the bargaining model, attribution errors question the 
model’s assumption that negotiations are an important source of information.  
Instead, an opponent’s intransigence over settlement terms will likely be perceived as 
a reflection of hostility rather than military strength.  Furthermore, belligerent A’s 
decision-makers are likely to overestimate the extent to which belligerent B’s 
concessions reflect belligerent B’s recognition of belligerent A’s superior military 
capabilities or resolve.  In short, cognitive-psychological theory suggests attribution 
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errors will render negotiations unlikely as an accurate or important source of 
information for belligerents.   
 In addition to attribution errors, scholars applying cognitive-psychological 
theory to studies of foreign policy claim that other forms of biases lead to 
misperceptions by decision-makers.107  Importantly, decision-makers faced with 
complex and uncertain situations may draw upon past events and historical analogies 
as simplifying heuristics to aid in the formation of current decisions.  Unfortunately 
for decision-makers, such “lessons of the past” are often misleading and result in 
inappropriate decisions.108  For example, Yuen Foong Khong argues that 
policymakers may inaccurately use previous wars as analogies from which to draw 
strategies in an ongoing war.  Once policymakers have viewed an ongoing conflict 
through the lens of analogies drawn from other wars, their perception of the present 
war may be resistant to change even in light of disconfirming evidence.  One 
consequence may be that policymakers continue to fight a war and do so using 
strategies that may be ineffective despite information that suggests a different course 
of action (i.e. changing strategies or agreeing to settlement terms).109 
 Another important bias found in political psychology is the “wishful thinking” 
bias.  When actors suffer from the wishful thinking bias “desirable outcomes are seen 
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as more likely to occur while undesirable outcomes are seen as less likely.”110  In 
particular, Jack Levy argues that there is a “tendency for military organizations ‘to 
see the necessary as possible’ despite objective circumstances.”111  In the wishful 
thinking bias the utility of a potential outcome affects perceptions about the 
probability of the possible outcome.   
 The interaction of utilities and estimated probabilities challenges the 
rationalist under-girding of the bargaining model by violating the assumption that 
decision-makers rationally estimate probabilities separately from calculations of 
expected utility.112  Moreover, wishful thinking may lead a belligerent’s decision-
makers and/or military organizations to push for continued fighting even when 
military success is (perhaps highly) improbable.  Therefore, a militarily unsuccessful 
belligerent may persist in war until the point at which objective information from the 
battlefield forces decision-makers and military leaders to alter their beliefs and accept 
that their military situation cannot be reversed.  Levy suggests that such strong and 
overwhelming evidence as near complete military collapse can lead individuals to 
update deeply held beliefs and biases.  However, he states that “a major change in 
personnel or regime” may be necessary in order for changed beliefs to enter into the 
decision-making apparatus of a belligerent.113  This prediction counters the 
                                                     
110 Levy, “Political Psychology,” 268, 269. 
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 29 
bargaining model prediction that belligerents will cease fighting and agree to 
settlement terms before there is agreement on which belligerent will win.114 
 In addition to misperception caused by biases, psychology also offers prospect 
theory as an alternative “behavioral decision” theory to rational choice.115  The basic 
assumption of prospect theory is that individuals establish a status quo reference point 
in regards to “assets” and frame problems they face in terms of deviations from that 
reference point.  Deviations can take the form of losses or gains.  According to 
prospect theory individuals “overvalue losses relative to comparable gains.” In other 
words, people are more concerned about losses than gains.116  Consequently, actors 
will be “risk-acceptant” in avoidance of losses and “risk-averse” in pursuit of gains.  
As a related point, decision-makers will exhibit “concession aversion” by resisting 
concessions resulting in loss more than concessions resulting in diminished gains.  
Additionally, actors will be “risk-seeking” in attempts to reverse losses that have been 
inflicted.117  A final and important point is prospect theory’s proposition that, after 
achieving gains, actors quickly renormalize on a new status quo that incorporates 
those gains.  If the gains are subsequently lost, the actor will perceive the loss not as a 
diminution of its gains but rather as an absolute loss.118   
 Four major implications for war termination may be drawn from the 
assumptions of prospect theory.  First, decision-makers of belligerents facing losses 
                                                     
114 Slantchev, “The Principle,” 621-623. 
115 Levy, “Loss Aversion, Framing Effects, and International Conflict: Perspectives from Prospect Theory,” 194. 
116 Levy, “Loss Aversion,” 194; Levy, “Political Psychology,” 268, 269. 
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are expected be more risk-acceptant and resolute while decision-makers of 
belligerents fighting for gains are expected to be risk-averse and less resolute.  
Second, decision-makers of belligerents who have suffered losses (such as lost 
territory) will gamble to recover what was lost.  Third, decision-makers will view the 
costs of war (i.e. casualties) as “sunk costs,” or “certain loss(es) in the absence of 
further action.”  Sunk costs will pressure decision-makers to persist in war.119  Lastly, 
for a belligerent, a loss of recent gains will be perceived by a belligerent’s decision-
makers as an absolute loss.120 These assumptions and implications stand in contrast to 
the rationalist-based bargaining model.  In sum, psychological theory poses numerous 
challenges to the rationalist-based assumptions, explanations, and predictions of the 
bargaining model of war termination.  
Domestic Politics and Organization Theory: Opening the ‘Black Boxed’ Belligerent 
 The above discussion of constructivism/critical theory and psychological 
theory serves primarily to challenge the rationalist foundations of the bargaining 
model.  However, the unitary actor assumption of the bargaining model must also be 
directly addressed.  Despite some allowance for regime-type effects, bargaining 
models of war termination still generally assume belligerents are unitary actors with 
exogenously given preferences.121  The following discussion of domestic politics 
approaches and organization theory will complement the above challenges to the 
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bargaining model by also questioning the model’s unitary actor assumptions.  
Domestic politics will be considered first and organization theory, second.  
 Joe D. Hagan has argued that across “the full variety of political systems,” 
domestic politics and political opposition influences foreign policy decision-
making.122  Hagan further claims that a state’s decision-making structures are not 
necessarily determined by regime type. Moreover, decision-making structures may 
vary among states with the same regime type.123 These arguments suggest that 
domestic political support for – or opposition to – continued war may influence war 
termination decisions with little regard for a belligerent’s regime type.  What is 
argued to be more important than regime type is the positioning of moderates and 
hard-liners in the decision-making structures of a state.  Moderates are those actors 
who, for reasons such as aversion to the risks/costs of war, pacifist ideology, or 
isolationist views, prefer “diplomatic accommodation” to war.   In contrast, hard-
liners are those who, for reasons such as nationalism or militarism, prefer “sustained 
confrontation.”124  
 Because decision-making dynamics may be variable within a single regime 
type, or even a single regime, war termination decisions may be dependent on 
changes in the relative influence or control wielded by either moderates or hard-
                                                     
122 Joe D. Hagan.  Political Opposition and Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective.  (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), Ch. 2, 
see 58. See also Jack Snyder.  Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition.  (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1991), Ch. 
2; Helen Milner, “Resisting the protectionist temptation: industry and the making of trade policy in France and the United States 
during the 1970s,” International Organization 41.4(1987): 639-665. 
123 Joe D. Hagan, “Does Decision Making Matter? Systemic Assumptions vs. Historical Reality in International Relations 
Theory.” International Studies Review 3.2(2001): 5-46.  See especially 34, 35. 
124 Joe D. Hagan, “Does Decision Making Matter? Systemic Assumptions vs. Historical Reality in International Relations 
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liners.125  For example, if moderates gain the upper hand in a belligerent’s decision-
making structures, the belligerent may make concessions or reduce demands in spite 
of military success on the battlefield.  Thus, regime type distinctions now accounted 
for in the bargaining model may miss important variations in decision-making across 
different belligerents.   
 In addition to domestic politics and political opposition, a belligerent’s 
military bureaucracies may influence war termination decisions.  Organization theory 
and bureaucratic politics models suggest that military bureaucracies will likely fail to 
communicate effectively with civilian leaders. Militaries may distort information 
because field commanders – the most important source of battlefield data – are likely 
to view their theater of a war optimistically.  This optimism may prevent recognition 
of declining relative capabilities or a failing strategy.  For instance, a field 
commander may believe that a currently failing strategy is sound but requires more 
resources (i.e. soldiers, armor, or air support) to be successful.126  According to 
organization theory and bureaucratic politics approaches, the problems of distorted 
battlefield information are exacerbated by the high value civilian decision-makers 
usually assign to field commanders’ assessments.127 Consequently, field 
commanders’ assessments may prevent the accurate updating of beliefs about the 
relative balance of military capabilities. 
                                                     
125 See Ibid. 34, 35.  See also Snyder, Ch. 2 for a discussion of different political structures that may exist within similar regime 
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126 Halperin, 86-95; Reiter, 34, 35.  Optimistic views among field commanders may stem from the previously discussed wishful 
thinking bias.  See Levy, “Political Psychology,” 268.  
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 Importantly, Halperin distinguishes between the role of field commanders and 
top military leaders (such as a General Staff or High Command) in war termination 
decision-making.  He claims that top military leaders both understand and mediate 
between the interests of the military bureaucracies and civilian leaders.  Furthermore, 
as the heads of the military bureaucracies, the influence of a belligerent state’s chief 
military leaders is argued to be particularly strong during wartime.128  As a result, a 
belligerent’s decision-makers may persist in war or make concessions based upon the 
assessments and views of top military leaders.129  This depiction suggests that, 
contrary to the bargaining model’s unitary actor assumption, the views of a 
belligerent’s ranking military leadership will have greater weight during war than the 
perspectives of other decision-makers (such as diplomats involved in negotiations). 
Organization theory and the bureaucratic politics model also warn that 
different belligerents – and different bureaucracies within belligerents – may use 
different measures to assess relative success or failure in war.  Reiter argues that two 
belligerents may “observe the same battle outcome with both concluding that they 
were successful, coming no closer to agreement on the eventual outcome of the war.”  
A poignant example is Napoleon Bonaparte’s capture of Moscow in 1812.  The 
French leader perceived the capture of Moscow as bringing closer the defeat of 
Russia. In contrast, Russian General Mikhail Kutuzov viewed the French seizure of 
Moscow as an overextension of Napoleon’s power that would bring about the defeat 
                                                     
128 Halperin, 90; Christopher M. Jones, “Toward a Third Generation Model: Rethinking Governmental Politics and Foreign 
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of the French forces. Reiter further points out that the bureaucracies within a 
belligerent’s government may judge success or failure by different rubrics.  For 
example, armies may focus on territory gained while navies focus on enemy ships 
sunk.  The use of different measures of success and failure may make problematic the 
bargaining model assumptions about calculations of relative capabilities and 
resolve.130 
  In sum, the constructivist approach, psychological theory, domestic politics 
approach, and organization theory suggest that the unitary rational actor assumption 
which under-girds the bargaining model may be a source of weakness rather than 
strength.  According to organization theory, a belligerent’s decision-making is 
affected by different subunits within the belligerent’s government and cannot 
accurately be conceived of as unitary.  Constructivism and psychological theory both 
argue that unitary or not, a belligerent’s decision-making process is unlikely to equate 
with ‘rationality’ as assumed by the bargaining model.  For constructivism, issues of 
belligerent identity and the social context of war are the challenges to rational choice, 
while for psychological theory, rationality is limited by mental processes, biases and 
misperceptions.  In any case, belligerents may not be unitary actors and may be 
unable to make rational calculations in the process of war and settlement negotiations.  
In their challenges to the bargaining model, these approaches may help us see 
variables and mechanisms in war termination that the bargaining model does not 
allow.  These alternative perspectives may make intelligible counterintuitive events 
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and outcomes in war and war termination that the bargaining model can neither 
explain nor predict.   
In addition to the above challenges, difficulties in measuring and assigning 
values to variables continue to be a problem for the formal models utilized by 
bargaining approach theorists.131  Clearly, Carroll’s call for more historical research is 
still valid today.132  Moreover war termination scholars have suggested that the 
challenges to the bargaining model approach may be ameliorated by performing case 
studies and collection of event level data.133    Slantchev argues that whatever the 
challenges, the bargaining approach to war termination theory “is a worthwhile 
research agenda” even if it requires “further scrutiny.”134  My work will provide the 
called-for historical case studies and offer further scrutiny of the war termination 
research agenda.  Such scrutiny focused on the bargaining model will help reveal 
whether the model’s predictions and explanations are sound or in need of revision.  
Furthermore, this thesis will also allow assessment of the challenges to the bargaining 
model and whether they may point to the need only for alterations of the bargaining 
model or an altogether thorough rethinking of war termination.
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Chapter 2: Research Design 
 The bargaining model has become the dominant approach to war termination 
theory.  Therefore, this thesis, with the purpose of understanding the processes by 
which wars end, is guided by a framework and set of hypotheses derived from the 
bargaining model. However, as noted in the previous chapter, critiques of the 
bargaining model pose fundamental challenges to the model’s assumptions, 
explanations, and predictions.  This thesis will juxtapose the bargaining model 
account of war termination with potential insights from alternative perspectives. 
Definitions 
 Though definitions have been provided for much of the terminology used in 
this study, it is necessary before proceeding to reiterate the most important 
definitions.  First, war is a violent mode of interaction between political units.1  
According to bargaining model theorists, war is also defined as a means “to secure 
political objectives by force.”2  Second, a belligerent is a political unit engaged in 
war with another political unit.  In war termination studies, belligerents are generally 
assumed to be states.3  Third, war termination is the resumption of a nonviolent 
mode of interaction between political units. 4   Fourth, settlement terms are the 
explicit and implicit agreements that, if accepted by each belligerent, terminate a 
                                                     
1 Paul Kecskemeti, “Political Rationality in Ending War.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 392 
(1970): 105-115.  One should note, however, that nonviolent modes of interaction such as negotiation may accompany the 
violent interaction on the battlefield. 
2 Branislav Slantchev, “The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations.”  American Political Science Review 
97.4(2003):621-632, see esp. 626. 
3 However, other political units, such as an alliance of two or more states, sub-national secessionist forces or guerrilla bands 
under the command of a warlord, might also conceivably be considered belligerents. 
4 Paul Kecskemeti, “Political Rationality in Ending War.”  
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war.5  Settlement terms are assumed to be formulated in negotiations, or the 
diplomatic bargaining between belligerents. Bargaining leverage is defined as the 
ability of a belligerent to demand more favorable settlement terms.6  In the 
bargaining model literature, bargaining leverage is related to military capabilities and 
resolve.  Military capabilities are the ability of one belligerent y to impose costs (i.e. 
killed/captured soldiers or destroyed materiel) on another belligerent.7  Resolve is a 
belligerent’s preference for continued battle over the settlement terms offered by an 
opposing belligerent. 8 
 In addition to the definitions at the core of the bargaining model, five other 
definitions merit mention.  First, battle strategy refers to the tactics or strategies with 
which the belligerents employ their military capabilities. 9  Second, reserves are the 
additional resources that a belligerent may mobilize for war.10 Third, the relative 
loss rate is a belligerent’s losses (i.e. casualties and lost materiel) in relation to the 
losses of the opposing belligerent.  Fourth the costs in terms of a belligerent’s 
leadership are defined as the penalties faced by leaders in the event of relative 
                                                     
5 See Suzanne Werner, “Negotiating the Terms of Settlement: War Aims and Bargaining Leverage.” The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 42.3(1998): 321-343.   
6 Suzanne Werner, “Negotiating the Terms of Settlement: War Aims and Bargaining Leverage.”  Werner on page 322 defines 
settlement terms as the “explicit and implicit agreements that arise or exist as consequence of the war’s ending.” 
7 Werner; R.H. Wagner, “Bargaining and War.” American Journal of Political Science 44.3(2000): 469-484; Dan Reiter, 
“Exploring the Bargaining Model of War.”  Perspectives on Politics 1.1(2003): 27-43; Slantchev, “How Initiators End Their 
Wars: the Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace.” American Journal of Political Science 48.4(2004): 813-829.” 
8 Wagner; Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner, “A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and 
Outcome of War.” American Journal of Political Science 46.4(2002): 819-837 
9 Ivan Arreguin-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict.” International Security 26.1(2001): 93-
128; 
10 Slantchev, “How Initiators End Their Wars: the Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace,” 817. 
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defeat. 11  Lastly, stakes are “the magnitude of the political gains and losses 
accruing to the opponents in case of an asymmetrical outcome (i.e. relative victory 
or defeat).”12  Equipped with the above definitions, a discussion of the variables, 
expected observations, and hypotheses is now more easily undertaken. 
Variables 
Drawing upon the bargaining model, the major dependent variable (DV1) to 
be explained in this thesis is the settlement terms agreed upon at the termination of 
the war. 13  Independent variable one (IV1) is the bargaining leverage of each 
belligerent in the negotiations of settlement terms.14  The war termination literature 
suggests that bargaining leverage is also a dependent variable (DV2) affected by other 
independent variables.   
One main category of independent variables presumed to affect bargaining 
leverage is comprised of variables related to a belligerent’s relative military 
capabilities.15  The first is independent variable two (IV2), a belligerent’s level of 
                                                     
11 Werner; H.E. Goemans, “Fighting for Survival: the Fate of Leaders and the Duration of War.” The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 44.5(2000): 555-579; H.E. Goemans, “War and Punishment”: The Causes of War Termination and the First World 
War. (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2000); Wagner; Reiter; Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner, “Bargaining and Fighting: The 
Impact of Regime Type on War Onset, Duration, and Outcomes.” American Journal of Political Science 48.2(2004): 296-313.  
Bahar Leventoğlu and Branislav Slantchev, “The Armed Peace: A Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of War.” American Journal of 
Political Science 51.4(2007): 755-771. 
12 Kecskemeti, 109. 
13 Werner; Slantchev, “How Initiators.” 
14 Werner, 328; R.H. Wagner, “Bargaining and War”; Goemans, “Fighting for Survival: the Fate of Leaders and the Duration of 
War”; H.E. Goemans, “War and Punishment”: The Causes of War Termination and the First World War; Darren Filson and 
Suzanne Werner, “A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and Outcome of War.”  American 
Journal of Political Science 46.4(2002): 819-837; Reiter, “Exploring the Bargaining Model of War”; Slantchev, “How Initiators 
End Their Wars: the Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace.”   
15 Werner; Wagner; Reiter; Slantchev, “How Initiators.” 
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reserves relative to its opponent.16  The second is independent variable three (IV3), 
the battle strategy or strategies with which the belligerents employ their soldiers and 
weapons.  For specifying battle strategy, Ivan Arreguin-Toft’s typology of strategies 
is used.  Belligerents may pursue a “direct” strategy of conventional warfare in which 
military forces are used to capture, fortify, and/or hold territory.  Belligerents may 
also use “indirect” strategies.  For a weak belligerent (i.e. a belligerent with relatively 
few resources in terms of manpower, armor, artillery, naval forces or air forces) 
guerrilla warfare is a likely indirect strategy.  For a strong belligerent (i.e. a 
belligerent with relatively plentiful resources in terms of manpower, armor, artillery, 
naval forces or air forces) an indirect strategy is “barbarism” the use of concentration 
camps, torture, or summary executions of insurgents and/or sympathizers.17  The final 
variable in this category is independent variable four (IV4), a belligerent’s rate of 
loss relative to the rate of loss suffered by its adversary. However, IV4 is assumed to 
be dependent on which battle strategies (IV3) the belligerents employ.  Therefore, 
IV4 may also be dependent variable three (DV3). Slantchev suggests that relative 
rates of loss are the criterion by which belligerents assess whether they are ‘winning’ 
or ‘losing’ in battle.18  Thus, in this thesis, battle outcomes will be measured by this 
rubric.       
The other category of independent variables argued to affect bargaining 
leverage is comprised of variables related to a belligerent’s relative level of resolve.  
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Resolve may be expressed when belligerent A rejects terms offered by belligerent B 
or when belligerent A knowingly offers terms that will be found unacceptable to 
belligerent B.19  For example, one belligerent’s rejection of moderated terms offered 
by the other belligerent would indicate to the offering belligerent, that its opponent 
had high resolve..20  According to the war termination literature, three independent 
variables populate the resolve category.  First, independent variable five (IV5) is a 
belligerent’s belief about the relative balance of military capabilities between the 
belligerents.21  The second of these, independent variable six (IV6), is the costs 
leaders face in the event of relative defeat.22  Third, independent variable seven 
(IV7), is the saliency of the issue over which the war is initiated and the consequent 
stakes a belligerent has in the war.23  IV7 has been assigned three values in previous 
bargaining model literature.  High stakes wars include those fought for “regime/state 
survival, national liberation, or autonomy.”  Medium stakes war are those fought for 
“territory, integrity of state, or honor/ideology.”  Low stakes wars involve issues such 
                                                     
19 Wagner; Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner, “A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and 
Outcome of War.” American Journal of Political Science 46.4(2002): 819-837.  
20 Werner; Goemans, “Fighting for Survival”; Goemans,  “War and Punishment”; Wagner,; Filson and Werner, “A Bargaining”; 
Reiter; Slantchev, “How Initiators.” 
21 Filson and Werner, “A Bargaining”; Branislav Slantchev, “The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations.” 
American Political Science Review 97.4(2003): 621-632; Slantchev, “How Initiators.” 
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as empire maintenance and economic disputes.24  The interactions between and 
among the variables described above can been seen in Figure 1.  The interactions are 
also discussed below both in terms of observations expected to be evident in the cases 
studied in this thesis, and in terms of the hypotheses of the bargaining model to be 
tested.   
Hypotheses and Expected Observations  
Bargaining Model Hypotheses and Expected Observations25 
Expected observation one (O1) is that belligerents will negotiate settlement 
terms for war termination with one another during the war.  This expectation must be 
qualified by the possibility that the onset of negotiations does not occur until  
belligerents have fought one or more battles.  Only after belligerents have fought one 
another will the likely outcomes of continued war become more predictable.26  O1 is 
the lynchpin of the bargaining model and this thesis.  Without the occurrence of 
negotiations, the bargaining model is without the forum for belligerent bargaining that 
the model treats as necessary for the validity of its other propositions.  
Expected observation two (O2) is that the settlement terms demanded by each 
belligerent will not only reflect each belligerent’s original war aims but will fluctuate 
                                                     
24 Slantchev, “How Initiators,” 819.  One should be aware that though resolve is affected by IV4 – IV7, there is the possibility 
that belligerents will strategically manipulate their behavior in negotiations in order to feign stronger military capabilities.  For 
this argument see Slantchev, “The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations,” 624, 628. 
25  The term “expected observation” refers to predicted events, actor behaviors, and outcomes that should be empirically 
supported given that the theory/hypothesis being tested is correct.  Expected observations differ from hypotheses in that they are 
not formulated as “if, then” statements.  Instead, they are general statements about what one should observe in reality if a 
theory’s explanations or predictions are correct.  I have adapted this term from Stephen Van Evera.  See Stephen Van Evera, 
Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1997), see 56. 
26 Paul R. Pillar, Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process. (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1983), Ch. 2-4. 
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as continued battle and negotiation reveal the relative military capabilities and resolve 
of each belligerent.27   Put more simply, O2 leads one to expect that the settlement 
terms a belligerent requires to cease fighting will be shaped by the shifting fortunes of 
war.  O2 is derived from the bargaining model’s assumption that settlement terms are 
“endogenous to the conflict.”28   
Figure 1: Flow-Chart of Bargaining Model Variables 
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Several hypotheses stem from O2 and the military capabilities category of 
independent variables.   Hypothesis one (H1) states that if belligerent A has more 
reserves (a higher value for IV2) relative to belligerent B, then ceteris paribus 
belligerent A will demand more favorable settlement terms than belligerent B.29   
                                                     
27 Pillar, Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process; Werner; Goemans, “Fighting for Survival”; Goemans, 
“War and Punishment”; Wagner; Filson and Werner, “A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, 
and Outcome of War”; Reiter; Slantchev, “How Initiators.”  
28 Werner, 322; Slantchev, “How Initiators.”  
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However, the strategy with which military forces are employed should also 
impact bargaining leverage.  The effect of strategy suggests several hypotheses.  First, 
hypothesis two (H2): if the belligerent with more powerful military resources 
employs a direct strategy against a belligerent with less powerful military resources 
also employing a direct strategy, then the belligerent with less powerful military 
resources will suffer higher relative rates of loss in battle.  Second, hypothesis three 
(H3): if the belligerent with  more powerful military resources employs a direct 
strategy against a belligerent with less powerful military resources employing an 
indirect strategy, then the belligerent with more powerful military resources will 
suffer higher relative rates of loss in battle.  Third, hypothesis four (H4): if the 
belligerent with  more powerful military resources employs an indirect strategy 
against a belligerent with less powerful military resources employing a direct 
strategy, then the belligerent with more powerful military resources will suffer higher 
relative rates of loss in battle.    Fourth, hypothesis five (H5): if the belligerent with  
more powerful military capabilities employs an indirect strategy against a belligerent 
with less powerful military capabilities also employing an indirect strategy, then the 
belligerent with less powerful military capabilities will suffer higher relative rates of 
loss in battle.30 
Slantchev argues that a belligerent with greater reserves relative to its 
adversary will demand more favorable settlement terms than its adversary.  However, 
Slantchev claims that relative rates of loss are more important than relative reserves 
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in a belligerent’s calculations of relative military capabilities.  This argument gives 
rise to two hypotheses. Hypothesis six (H6) states that if belligerent A suffers losses 
at a greater rate than belligerent B, then ceteris paribus belligerent A will moderate 
its settlement terms (i.e. decrease its demands or make concessions).31   On the other 
hand, hypothesis seven (H7) states that if belligerent A suffers losses at a lesser rate 
than belligerent B, then ceteris paribus belligerent A will not moderate its settlement 
terms (i.e. maintain or perhaps increase its demands).32 
Also stemming from O2 is the expectation that settlement terms will reflect in 
part the balance of resolve. This expectation gives rise to hypothesis eight (H8).  H8 
states that if belligerent A exhibits resolve by refusing to moderate (either by 
decreasing demands or increasing concessions) its settlement terms, then ceteris 
paribus belligerent B will moderate its settlement terms.33 However, as noted above, 
several variables may affect a belligerent’s resolve.  Therefore, additional hypotheses 
must be considered.34  
Resolve may be affected by a belligerent’s beliefs about its military 
capabilities relative to those of its opponent.  Slantchev’s argument regarding the 
effect of relative loss rates is instructive in this regard.  Because relative loss rates are 
                                                     
31 Slantchev, “How Initiators,” 817. 
32 See Ibid.  Slantchev does not state this hypothesis himself but it is a reasonable corollary to H6.   
33 See Filson and Werner, “A Bargaining”; Goemans, “Fighting for Survival”; Goemans, “War and Punishment”; Wagner; 
Slantchev, “The Principle.”  This hypothesis has not been directly stated by bargaining model theorists but is suggested by the 
informational effects attributed to negotiation.  See Filson and Werner “A Bargaining”; Branislav Slantchev, “The Principle.” 
34 Filson and Werner, “A Bargaining”; Goemans, “Fighting for Survival”; Goemans, “War and Punishment”; Wagner; 
Branislav Slantchev, “The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations”; Slantchev, “How Initiators.” 
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considered to be the most important source of information about relative military 
capabilities, a belligerent’s appraisal of relative military capabilities should be 
primarily affected by relative loss rates.  However, the balance of reserves between 
belligerents is suggested to provide a baseline for a belligerent’s assessment of 
relative military capabilities.35  Thus, hypotheses H1, H6, and H7 capture this 
component of a belligerent’s resolve.   
Before proceeding, the effects of a belligerent’s beliefs about the balance of 
military capabilities must be distinguished from other factors assumed to affect 
resolve.  Taken by itself, the influence of beliefs about relative military capabilities 
should result in the fluctuation of a belligerent’s resolve in accord with the shifting 
tides of battle.36  However, the bargaining model literature suggests that other factors 
(i.e. regime-type and the stakes of the war) influence a belligerent’s resolve in spite of 
its beliefs about the balance of forces or the prospects of continued war.37 
The first of these other factors, a belligerent’s regime type, may have an 
important impact on its resolve.  Three regime types have been considered in the 
bargaining model literature and three hypotheses have been suggested.  First, 
hypothesis nine (H9): if a belligerent is led by a mixed authoritarian regime, then it 
will refuse to moderate its settlement terms even if it faces outright military defeat in 
continued battle.  Mixed authoritarian regimes are described by Goemans as those that 
                                                     
35 Slantchev, “How Initiators”; see also Filson and Werner, “A Bargaining”; Slantchev, “The Principle.” 
36 See especially, Slantchev, “How Initiators.” 
37 See Goemans, “Fighting for Survival”; Goemans, “War and Punishment”; Slantchev, “How Initiators.” 
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“use repression and exclude a significant proportion of their populace from access [to 
the] policy-making process.”  Goemans states that leaders of mixed authoritarian 
regimes show high levels of resolve because they lack the repressive capabilities of 
dictatorships and “suffer severe penalties (costs [IV6]) above and beyond the loss of 
power even if they lose the war only moderately.”  The penalties faced may include 
imprisonment or death and lead those in charge of mixed regimes to reject 
unfavorable settlement terms, and instead continue to fight even a losing war in hopes 
of winning a “gamble for resurrection” rather than accept defeat. 38   
The second hypothesis related to regime type is hypothesis ten (H10).  H10 
states that if a belligerent is led by a dictatorial regime, then it will moderate its 
settlement terms when experiencing a higher rate of losses in battle than its adversary.  
According to Goemans, the lower resolve of dictators is due to the higher costs such 
leaders face for a disastrous loss than a moderate loss.  Additionally, Goemans argues 
that dictators are better able to weather moderate than severe defeats because they 
typically have a repressive apparatus to facilitate their continued hold on power.39   
The third hypothesis related to regime type is hypothesis eleven (H11).  H11 
states that if a belligerent is led by a democratic regime, then it will moderate its 
settlement terms when experiencing a higher rate of losses in battle than its 
                                                     
38 Goemans, “Fighting for Survival,” see especially 577; Goemans, “War and Punishment”; Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner, 
“Bargaining and Fighting: The Impact of Regime Type on War Onset, Duration, and Outcomes.” American Journal of Political 
Science 48.2(2004): 296-313, see 558.  See also Slantchev, “How Initiators” for a discussion of relative loss rates. 
39 Ibid.  See also Slantchev, “How Initiators” for a discussion of relative loss rates. 
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adversary.40  The low resolve of democratic belligerents is hypothesized to stem from 
the higher costs elected leaders face for a disastrous as opposed to moderate loss.  
Consequently, democratic belligerents are more sensitive to the costs of war and are 
less likely to continue fighting in hopes of making fewer concessions in an 
unsuccessful war. Additionally, Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner suggest expected 
observation three (O3): when experiencing battlefield success, democratic 
belligerents will not increase their demands.  Democratic belligerents will not exploit 
military success by increasing demands because they prefer to end the war rather than 
continue fighting to gain a more favorable outcome.41   In sum, one should see 
differences in resolve across different regime types reflected in the negotiation of 
settlement terms.   
 In addition to regime type, resolve may also be a partial expression of the 
stakes for which a belligerent goes to war.42  Slantchev defines three levels for the 
stakes of a war: high, medium, and low.  Unfortunately, Slantchev does not explicitly 
specify what negotiating behavior should be exhibited by belligerents for a given 
level of stakes in a war. 43  Therefore, I will extrapolate from Slantchev’s anecdotal 
evidence and Goemans’ propositions regarding the effects of regime type on 
resolve.44 
                                                     
40 Goemans, “Fighting for Survival”; Goemans, “War and Punishment”; Filson and Werner, “Bargaining and Fighting: The 
Impact of Regime Type on War Onset, Duration, and Outcomes.” See also Slantchev, “How Initiators” for a discussion of 
relative loss rates. 
41 Goemans, “Fighting for Survival,” 555-559; Filson and Werner, “Bargaining and Fighting.”  
42 See Kecskemeti; Slantchev, “How Initiators,” 817. 
43Slantchev, “How Initiators,” 817, 819. 
44 Goemans, “Fighting for Survival”; Goemans, “War and Punishment”; Slantchev, “How Initiators.” 
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In high stakes wars a belligerent is fighting for “regime/state survival, national 
liberation, or autonomy” and one can expect that a belligerent will behave in a way 
analogous to Goemans’ mixed authoritarian regime.45  Thus, hypothesis twelve 
(H12): if for a given belligerent the stakes of the war are high, then ceteris paribus 
the belligerent will refuse to moderate its settlement terms even if it faces outright 
military defeat in continued battle.46   
Though the bargaining model literature is least clear about belligerent 
behavior in medium stakes wars, one may form some expectations about belligerent 
behavior.  Recall that medium stakes wars are fought over “territory, integrity of 
state, or honor/ideology.”47  Hypothesis thirteen (H13) is formulated based on the 
work of Slantchev and Goemans.  H13 states that if for a given belligerent the stakes 
of the war are medium, then ceteris paribus the belligerent will moderate its 
settlement terms when incurring greater rates of losses than its adversary but will 
persist in war in order to achieve some its most salient aims. 48  However, a caveat is 
that a belligerent fighting a medium stakes war should agree to terms before it faces a 
military situation that cannot reasonably be reversed in its favor.49   
Fortunately, the literature is more instructive in regards to low stakes wars – 
wars fought over “maintaining an empire, commercial disputes, or policy.”  Evidence 
utilized by Slantchev suggests that belligerent resolve in a low stakes war will be 
                                                     
45 Goemans, “Fighting for Survival”; Goemans, “War and Punishment”; Slantchev, “How Initiators,” 819. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Slantchev, “How Initiators,” 819. 
48 Goemans, “Fighting for Survival”; Goemans, “War and Punishment”; Slantchev, “How Initiators,” 819.  How long or under 
what circumstances a belligerent will continue to fight is not clear for this level of stakes.   
49  This is my own assumption for medium stakes wars but it has been based on the above cited work of Paul Kecskemeti. 
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even less than that exhibited in Goemans’ depiction of democratic regimes. Thus, 
hypothesis fourteen (H14): if for a given belligerent the stakes of the war are low, 
then ceteris paribus the belligerent will dramatically moderate or forsake its 
settlement terms when experiencing a higher rate of losses in battle than its 
adversary.50    
 The fourteen hypotheses outlined directly above present a complicated set of 
hypotheses through which the bargaining model attempts to explain and predict war 
termination.  However we may categorize the hypotheses in a manner that makes 
them more readily comprehensible.  The hypotheses may be separated into four 
categories: material, regime, negotiation effects and stakes.  Material hypotheses 
comprise H1- H7 and are labeled ‘material’ due to their focus on belligerents’ 
material (e.g. military) capabilities and the strategies through which those capabilities 
are employed.  H8 captures the bargaining model’s predictions regarding the effects 
of negotiation. Regime hypotheses comprise H9 – H11 (see also O3) and are 
classified as ‘regime’ hypotheses because of their emphasis on the effects of a 
belligerents’ regime type on its resolve.  Stakes hypotheses (H12-H14), capture the 
expected relationship between the stakes of a war and a belligerent’s resolve.  For a 
summary of the hypotheses specified above and their categorization, see Table 1 in 
the Appendix. 
                                                     
50 Goemans, “Fighting for Survival”; Goemans, “War and Punishment”; Filson and Werner, “Bargaining and Fighting: The 
Impact of Regime Type on War Onset, Duration, and Outcomes.” Slantchev, “How Initiators,” 819; Kecskemeti, 109.  As 
pointed out in the first chapter of this thesis, only Kecskemeti addresses intra-war changes in the stakes of a conflict.  Bargaining 
model theorists have not addressed stake fluctuation. However, Kecskemeti does not elaborate on the causes behind fluctuation 
in the stakes of the war. 
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Alternative Hypotheses and Expected Observations 
 The hypotheses derived from the bargaining model, despite the allowance for 
belligerents with different regimes to behave differently, rest upon the assumption 
that the belligerents involved in war termination negotiations are unitary actors 
making rational calculations concerning whether to accept settlement terms or 
continue fighting.51  However, other factors such as the social context of war, non-
rationality of leaders, domestic politics, organizational competition, and differing 
interests among a belligerent’s allies have been argued to prevent belligerents from 
behaving as unitary rational actors.52  Furthermore, psychological theory suggests that 
even if belligerents were unitary actors, it is unlikely that they would make the 
rational calculations assumed by the bargaining model.53 
The above arguments and theoretical viewpoints have been cited as challenges 
to the bargaining model’s ability to explain and predict the processes and outcomes of 
war termination.54 Beyond questioning the bargaining model, constructivism, critical 
theory, political psychology approaches, domestic politics approaches, and 
                                                     
51 See Wagner; Reiter; Slantchev, “How Initiators.” 
52 Morton H. Halperin, "War Termination as a Problem in Civil-Military Relations." Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 392.Nov (1970):  86-95.  Michael I. Handel, War Termination - a Critical Survey. (Jerusalem: Alpha 
P, 1978).  C R Mitchell and Michael Nicholson. "Rational Models and the Ending of Wars." The Journal of Conflict Resolution 
27.3 (1983):  495-520.  Wallace J. Thies, "Searching for Peace: Vietnam and the Question of How Wars End." Polity 7.3 (1975):  
304-333; Yuen Foong Khong, “Seduction by Analogy in Vietnam: the Malaya and Korean Analogies.” in Kenneth W. 
Thompson, ed. Institutions and Leadership: Prospects for the Future. (New York: University Press of America, 1987), 65-77; 
Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965. (Princeton: 
Princeton UP, 1992); David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity. Rev. ed. 
(Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1988); Friedrich Kratochwil, “Looking back from somewhere: reflections on what remains 
‘critical’ in critical theory.” Review of  International Studies 33(2007): 25-45, see 29; Reiter, “Exploring the Bargaining Model 
of War.”   
53 Quester.   
54 Reiter; Wagner. 
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organization theory offer alternative explanations and predictions about the processes 
and outcomes of war termination.  The alternative hypotheses and expected 
observations derived from the above approaches/theories will be discussed in the 
order of their listing. As will become evident, a very different portrayal of war is 
offered by these alternative perspectives.   
 Critical theory suggests that the leaders of belligerent states will justify wars 
and seek to obtain public support by portraying their own “healthy” and “civilized” 
state as engaged in a war with a “sick” or barbaric opponent.55  Thus, alternative 
expected observation one (AO1): a belligerent’s leader will rally public support by 
exploiting dichotomous images of the state as opposed to the adversary.  
Complementing critical theory, constructivism suggests that as the duration of a war 
increases, the “practice of violence” will lead opposing belligerents to view the other 
“as an intractably hostile barbarian.”56 From this observation can be derived 
alternative hypothesis one (AH1): as the duration of a war increases, ceteris paribus 
the more concessions in the settlement terms a belligerent will demand from its 
opponent.57 
Political psychology approaches offer alternative hypotheses and expected 
observations that directly challenge the hypotheses derived the rationalist bargaining 
model.  First, the dispositional, fundamental attribution, and situational attribution 
                                                     
55 Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, Introduction, Ch. 4, 3, 9, 11, 75-88 
56 Reiter, 36. 
57 Reiter, 36; see also Iver B. Neumann, “Identity and Security,” Journal of Peace Research 29.2(1992): 221-226; Campbell, 
Introduction, Ch. 4, 3, 9, 11, 75-88; Friedrich Kratochwil, “Looking back from somewhere: reflections on what remains ‘critical’ 
in critical theory.”   
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errors discussed in the previous chapter question the bargaining model assumption 
that negotiations provide accurate information to a belligerent about their opponent’s 
resolve or military capabilities.58  Political psychology approaches give rise to an 
expectation that a belligerent’s refusal to moderate its settlement terms will not be 
perceived by its opponent as a sign of strength or resolve.  Instead the refusal will be 
seen as an artifact of the adversary’s hostility.59  This suggests alternative hypothesis 
two (AH2): if belligerent A exhibits resolve by refusing to moderate (either by 
decreasing demands or increasing concessions) its settlement terms, then ceteris 
paribus belligerent B will not moderate its settlement terms.  On the other hand, 
political psychology approaches lead one to expect that belligerent A will perceive 
belligerent B’s moderation of settlement terms as a result of belligerent A’s resolve or 
military strength.60  Therefore, in instances in which one belligerent makes 
concessions to its opponent, political psychology does not predict an outcome 
different from that predicted by the bargaining model.61   
Second, foreign policy analysts applying political psychology in their studies 
have argued that decision-makers and military leaders draw upon “lessons of the 
past” and historical analogies in order to form current policy decisions.62  The 
                                                     
58 Jack S. Levy, “Political Psychology and Foreign Policy.”  in David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis, eds.  Oxford 
Handbook of Political Psychology.  (New York:  Oxford UP, 2003), 253-84; Jack Snyder.  Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics 
and International Ambition.  (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1991), Ch. 2. 
59 Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition, 29; Levy, “Political Psychology,” 264-266. 
60 Ibid. 
61 However, the mechanisms assumed to underlie belligerent behaviors do differ. 
62 Yuen Foong Khong, “Seduction by Analogy in Vietnam: the Malaya and Korean Analogies,” 65-77; Yuen Foong Khong, 
Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965; Levy, “Political Psychology,” 267; see 
also Halperin, 89. 
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tendency for decision-makers and military leaders to rely on such simplifying 
heuristic leads to alternative expected observation two (AO2): decision-makers will 
use historical analogies in the formation of war and war termination decisions.  
Unfortunately for decision-makers, historical analogies are often poor guides for 
current action.  Yet, because cognitive-psychology suggests that decision-makers’ 
beliefs will resist change, a belligerent may continue to act in accord with the past 
lessons even if such actions are unsuccessful.63  Thus, AO2 lends itself to alternative 
hypothesis three (AH3): if a belligerent’s decision-makers and/or military leaders 
employ inappropriate historical analogies in the formation of strategy during war, 
then ceteris paribus the belligerent will suffer higher rates of losses than its 
opponent.64   
Note that AH3 potentially presents a problem of circular reasoning.  Indeed, 
Yuen Foong Khong points out scholars studying the use of historical analogies in 
foreign policy decision-making at least implicitly infer inappropriate analogy use 
from poor policy outcomes.  However, Khong defends this practice, stating: “If there 
were no positive relationship between poor use and bad policy outcomes, it would not 
be very interesting to document poor use.”  Moreover, Khong claims that “the vast 
majority” of studies support a view that inappropriate use of historical analogies is the 
                                                     
63 Yuen Foong Khong, “Seduction by Analogy in Vietnam: the Malaya and Korean Analogies”; Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies 
at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965.; Levy, “Political Psychology,” 267. 
64 Khong, “Seduction by Analogy,” 65-77; Khong, “Analogies at War”;  Levy, “Political Psychology,” 267. 
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norm rather than the exception.65  Thus, while testing of AH3 is possible, one should 
be cognizant of the potential for circular reasoning.   
Third, proponents of political psychology approaches have also presented the 
“wishful thinking” bias as an explanation of belligerents’ behavior.  If suffering from 
the wishful thinking bias, a belligerent’s decision-makers and military leaders are 
likely to persist in war even when the probability of military success is (very) low.  
Levy also argues that only very strong objective information from battle (such as near 
complete military collapse) may force decision-makers and military leaders to 
abandon their wishful thinking.  Moreover, major personnel or even regime change 
may be necessary in order to bring changed beliefs into a belligerent’s decision-
making structure.66  The wishful thinking bias suggests alternative hypothesis four 
(AH4).  AH4 states that if a belligerent’s decision-makers suffer from the wishful 
thinking bias, then the decision-makers will refuse to moderate settlement terms even 
if facing outright military defeat in continued battle. Jack Levy claims that, though 
other decision-makers are susceptible, military organizations are particularly prone to 
the wishful thinking bias.67  Alternative expected observation three (AO3) is derived 
from the wishful thinking bias and the propensity for militaries to suffer from its 
                                                     
65 Khong, “Analogies at War,” 30, 31, see footnote 34. 
66 Jack S. Levy, “Loss Aversion, Framing Effects, and International Conflict: Perspectives from Prospect Theory.”  in Manus I. 
Midlarsky, ed.  Handbook of War Studies II.  (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 193-221; Levy, “Political 
Psychology,” 265-269. 
67 Jack S. Levy, “Loss Aversion, Framing Effects, and International Conflict: Perspectives from Prospect Theory.”  in Manus I. 
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effects.  AO3 states that military organizations (particularly field commanders) will 
distort battlefield information by overestimating the probability of military success.68 
In addition to the above alternative hypotheses and expected observations 
derived from psychology, prospect theory suggests two hypotheses about war 
termination.69  Alternative hypothesis five (AH5) states that if a belligerent’s 
decision-makers frame the war as an effort to avoid losses (i.e. a loss of “sunk costs,” 
territory, a colonial possession, etcetera), then the decision-makers will refuse to 
moderate settlement terms even if facing outright military defeat in continued battle.70  
On the other hand is alternative hypothesis six (AH6): if a belligerent’s decision-
makers frame the war as an effort to achieve gains (i.e. additional territory or a new 
colonial possession), then the decision-makers will moderate settlement terms when 
experiencing a higher rate of losses in battle than the adversary.71However, having 
achieved gains in a war, a belligerent is likely to quickly renormalize a new status quo 
that includes those gains.  Therefore, prospect theory provides alternative expected 
observation four (AO4): for a belligerent’s decision-makers, the loss of recent gains 
will not be framed as diminished gains but as an absolute loss.72 In sum, the 
hypotheses derived from prospect theory and psychology offer clear, testable 
alternatives to the bargaining model hypotheses. 
                                                     
68 Halperin, 86-95; Levy, “Political Psychology,” 265-269. 
69 See Chapter 1 for a more detailed discussion of prospect theory. 
70 Jack S. Levy, “Loss Aversion, Framing Effects, and International Conflict: Perspectives from Prospect Theory”; Levy, 
“Political Psychology,” 268-270. 
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Organizational theory and domestic politics approaches to foreign policy 
analysis provide alternative hypotheses and expected observations that add to and 
complement those offered by critical theory, constructivism, and political psychology.  
The first two of these stem from Joe D. Hagan’s domestic politics argument regarding 
domestic opposition and the role moderate and hard-line decision-makers play in a 
state’s foreign policy.  On one hand is alternative hypothesis seven (AH7): if 
moderate actors are able to dominate a belligerent’s decision-making apparatus, then 
the belligerent will moderate its settlement terms.  On the other hand is alternative 
hypothesis eight (AH8): if hard-line actors are able to dominate a belligerent’s 
decision-making apparatus, then the belligerent will refuse to moderate its settlement 
terms even if it faces outright military defeat in continued battle.73   
Additionally, organization theory offers two hypotheses and an expected 
observation.  First, alternative expected observation five (AO5): belligerents and 
separate bureaucracies within each belligerent’s government will use unique 
measures of success and failure and will view the same outcome (i.e. of a battle) in 
different ways.  Different perceptions of the same outcome may make problematic the 
updating of beliefs about the relative balance of military capabilities between 
belligerents.  Second, organization theory suggests (similar to the wishful thinking 
bias above) that a belligerent’s field commanders will view optimistically their own 
theatre of operations.  Therefore AO3 may also be considered to fall within 
                                                     
73 Joe D. Hagan.  Political Opposition and Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective.  (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), Ch. 2; 
Joe D. Hagan, “Does Decision Making Matter? Systemic Assumptions vs. Historical Reality in International Relations Theory.” 
International Studies Review 3.2(2001): 105-115.  See especially 12, 27, 34, 35. 
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organization theory.  Lastly, Morton H. Halperin claims that a belligerent’s chief 
military leaders (e.g. Chiefs of Staff or High Command) will be particularly 
influential in war termination decision-making.  Thus, alternative hypothesis nine 
(AH9): if a belligerent’s chief military leaders support moderating settlement terms, 
then settlement terms will be moderated.  In contrast, alternative hypothesis ten 
(AH10) states that if a belligerent’s chief military leaders oppose moderating 
settlement terms, then settlement terms will not be moderated.74  In short, domestic 
politics approaches and organization theory challenge the bargaining model by 
arguing that military field commanders and top leaders will have greater influence on 
war termination decisions than other actors such as the diplomats involved in 
negotiations.75  
  The above alternatives to the bargaining model’s predictions/explanations of 
war termination allow a contrast in predictions and explanations that facilitates testing 
of the bargaining model against empirical evidence.  The alternative hypotheses and 
expected observations are grouped according to the theory/approach from which they 
were derived.  AH1 and AO1 are drawn from constructivism and critical theory.  
Psychological theory provides AH2, AH3, AH4, AH5, AH6, AO2, AO3, and AO4.  
Domestic politics approaches and organization theory offer AH7, AH8, AH9, H10 
and AO5.  For a summary of the alternative hypotheses and expected observations, 
please see Table 2 in the Appendix. 
                                                     
74 Halperin, 87-95; Reiter, 34-35. 
75 Halperin, 87-95; Christopher M. Jones, “Toward a Third Generation Model: Rethinking Governmental Politics and Foreign 
Policy Analysis.”  Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago, February 28-March 
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Methodology 
The variables, expected observations, and hypotheses discussed above pose 
difficult challenges to researchers.  In spite of a heavy sprinkling of the “ceteris 
paribus clause” in the single hypotheses above, when the hypotheses and expected 
observations are taken together, it is highly improbable that all other things are ever 
equal.  The resultant interactions of variables and predictions/explanations of the 
separate hypotheses leave the researcher with important questions.  What is the causal 
impact of a particular variable?  When is its causal impact greater or weaker?  Which 
hypothesis has the greatest predictive/explanatory power?  When does a particular 
hypothesis have greater predictive/explanatory ability than other hypotheses?  When 
is it overshadowed by the predictions and/or explanations of other hypotheses?   
For example, is the prediction of H8 – that belligerent B will moderate its 
settlement terms if belligerent A refuses to moderate – better able to predict final 
settlement terms than H6’s prediction that belligerent B will moderate its settlement 
terms if it suffers battle losses at a greater rate than belligerent A?  Or, consider other 
hypotheses regarding resolve.  Do the stakes of the war matter more than a 
belligerent’s regime type?  An objective of this study is to shed some light on these 
questions and offer directions by which further study can begin to offer answers.   
Achieving this objective will require a method that is able to address both interactions 
between the variables and overlapping predictions and explanations of the 
hypotheses. 
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The method chosen to confront the above challenges is the version of the case 
study method formulated by Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett.76  The case 
study method of George and Bennett “attempts to identify the intervening causal 
process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable 
(variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable.”77 Put more simply, process-
tracing involves exploration of “the chain of events or the decision-making process by 
which initial case conditions are translated into case outcomes.”78  The empirical 
exploration involved in process-tracing requires that a researcher dissect the causal 
link between an independent variable (variables) and a dependent variable or outcome 
by breaking a single event into “temporal and possibly causal sequences of events.”79 
Once a single event has been broken down into a series of steps, a researcher looks 
for evidence that the hypothesized relationship(s) between independent variables and 
the dependent variable is empirically supported at each step of the process by which 
initial conditions are transformed into outcomes.80   
This method was chosen for several reasons.  First, Stephen Van Evera claims 
that one strength of process-tracing is its ability to allow researchers to explain how 
an independent variable or variables (X or Xs) affect(s) the dependent variable (Y).   
                                                     
76 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 2004). 
77 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, see 206. 
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Van Evera argues that large-n statistical hypothesis tests can establish that X affects 
Y and the direction of the relationship but cannot offer insight into the causal process 
to the extent that process-tracing is able.81  Additionally, Bennett and George argue 
that process-tracing produces less measurement error than quantitative analysis 
“because it can intensively assess a few variables along several qualitative 
dimensions, rather than having to quantify variables across many cases.”82  Despite 
these strengths of process-tracing when compared to large-n statistical studies, one 
potential weakness is that the very small number of case studies in this thesis limits 
what can be inferred from the evidence.  However, Bennett and George explain that 
by breaking a case into several sequential steps or events (observations) and 
determining whether a hypothesis is supported by each step in the process leading to 
an outcome, inference is possible within even a single case.83 
 Another reason for employing process-tracing is the method’s ability to 
analyze complex events in which interaction among multiple variables occurs.  Many 
phenomena studied in the field of international relations involve relationships that are 
characterized by complex (i.e. flowing from the convergence of severable variables), 
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rather than linear, causality.84  War termination theory and the bargaining model are 
also characterized by complex causality and therefore are well served by studies using 
process-tracing.  Furthermore, the expected observations and hypotheses generated by 
the bargaining model are not only subject to complex causality in which the effects of 
variables converge, but also involve interaction between the causal impacts of the 
variables.85   
Take, for example, the interactions among IV5, IV6, IV7, bargaining leverage 
(DV2/IV1), and settlement terms (DV1).   The effects of independent variables IV5, 
IV6, IV7 are all aspects of a belligerent’s resolve and are presumed to affect the 
belligerent’s bargaining leverage (DV2).  Bargaining leverage, in turn, is an 
independent variable (IV1) affecting settlement terms (DV1).  This example 
illustrates the presence of complex and interactive causality in the bargaining model.  
Process-tracing will allow testing of the bargaining model despite the challenges of 
complexity and interaction. 
Compounding the issues of complex causality and interactions among 
independent variables is the potential for equifinality.  Equifinality refers to the fact 
that in different cases, with different sets of independent variables, the same type of 
outcome can arise.  George and Bennett argue that just as complex causality and 
interactive effects are often present in social phenomena, so too is equifinality.86 
Process-tracing requires researchers to be cognizant of equifinality and allows them 
                                                     
84 George and Bennett, 212; Andrew Bennet and Alexander L. George, “Case Studies in Process Tracing in History and 
Political Science: Similar Strokes for Different Foci.” see 138. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Bennett and George, 138; George and Bennett, 157. 
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to map different causal paths of independent variables by which the same outcome 
could have occurred.   This ability of process-tracing allows researchers to determine 
what different conditions may lead causal paths of different independent variables to 
result in the same outcome.87    Thus, process-tracing is particularly useful for testing 
the bargaining model’s hypotheses in which warring belligerents led by different 
types of regimes, with different levels of military capabilities, using different 
strategies may lead to the same type of outcome.  George and Bennett argue that 
process-tracing not only makes possible theory testing in cases subject to equifinality, 
but also is useful for building typological theories.  Typological theories are 
“contingent generalizations under which the same value of an independent variable 
can have different effects (multifinality), or different mixes of variables can have the 
same effect (equifinality).88  Such theories, built using process-tracing methods in 
case studies, may prove to be practical for war termination studies.   
Case Selection 
  The case selected is the Philippines War, 1899-1902. This case is selected 
based on several criteria.  First, Van Evera suggests selection of cases with “data 
richness” when process-tracing is to be utilized.89 Data richness refers to the 
availability of archival data, individuals for interviewing, or data assembled by other 
scholars.  In this study, I have selected a case for which historians have done the 
                                                     
87 Bennett and George, 138, 157; George and Bennett, 157, 207. 
88 Bennett and George, 138, 157; see also George and Bennett, 207. 
89 Van Evera, 79. 
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archival “legwork” and produced narratives of the events studied here.90  However, 
using historical narratives poses some challenges to political science research.  Before 
proceeding to the other criteria of case selection, it is necessary to discuss the use of 
historians’ work as sources for empirical evidence.   
Ian Lustick warns that “unself-conscious” selection of historical monographs 
creates selection bias in the research based on the monographs.91  Lustick states that 
historians do not write theory-free narratives and different historians may offer 
different accounts of the same event based on the (often implicit) theories or 
conceptual frameworks that guide their analysis.  Political scientists often allow their 
own theory and hypotheses to lead them only to historical sources that will provide 
confirmation.92  The main solution to this form of selection bias is not for political 
scientists to engage in primary research, but rather for political scientists to 
systematically and self-consciously select source material.93  Where possible, I have 
selected sources by using book reviews (two per source) from academic journals to 
find histories approved by other historians as accurate in terms of both archival work 
and interpretation of the primary source material.  While even this method of 
screening sources is imperfect, Lustick argues that so long as the limits of using 
historical narratives are recognized, the sources may be regarded as accounts “of what 
                                                     
90 Ibid. 
91 Ian Lustick, “History, Historiography, and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records and the Problem of Selection Bias.” 
The American Political Science Review 90.3(1996): 605-618. 
92 Ian Lustick, “History, Historiography, and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records and the Problem of Selection Bias,” 
605-608. 
93 Ibid., 614. 
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actually occurred in the past.”94  Hence, I do recognize that no historical account is a 
perfect representation of a past reality but, in this thesis, the sources used are treated 
as accounts of what actually happened.   
 Having addressed the issue of using historical narratives, the discussion of 
case selection criteria may be resumed.  The second criterion in case selection is that 
the war must be dyadic.  A dyadic war is selected in order to facilitate a simpler test 
of the hypotheses suggested by the bargaining model of war termination.  Mitchell 
and Nicholson’s work illustrates the difficulty of studying war termination in cases 
with multiple belligerents.95  While the examination of only a dyadic war may 
diminish any claim that this thesis provides a hard test of the bargaining model, 
simple tests are needed to assess the basic validity of the model before more 
complicated tests are attempted. 
   Third, this case is selected such that the regime types expected to have the 
highest and lowest resolve are represented in the belligerents.  This criterion was used 
to allow testing of the hypotheses: H9 and H11.  The Philippine-American War is an 
example of a war between a mixed-authoritarian regime (Philippine Republic) and a 
democracy (United States).96  A larger study, with more cases, would likely be able to 
offer instances of dictatorships at war with democracies and other combinations of 
regime types at war with one another.  However, by including the regime types 
                                                     
94 Lustick, 615. 
95 Mitchell and Nicholson, “Rational Models and the Ending of Wars.” 
96 One might consider the Philippines to have been a dictatorship at the time of the Philippine-American War.  However, as will 
be seen in chapter three, the Philippines’ regime was a dictatorship in name but in practice had the attributes of a mixed-
authoritarian regime.   
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predicted to have the highest (Philippines) and weakest (US) resolve, the case 
selected allows a sufficient level of variance to adequately test the hypotheses 
regarding the effects of regime type on war termination.  In the selection of this case, 
Goemans’ basic proposition – that the fate of the belligerent state’s leaders affects 
war termination – is taken into careful consideration.97 
Fourth, in the case selection for this study, variation in the stakes over which 
belligerents initiated war has been taken into account.98 Selecting the case based on 
the stakes of the war permits testing of hypotheses H12 and H14.  Cases testing H13 
are avoided because the unclear prediction regarding belligerent behavior in medium 
stakes wars makes testing of H13 problematic. In the case of the Philippine-American 
War, the Philippine Republic is fighting for its independence and the survival of the 
Filipino regime while the US fought a war of “empire maintenance.”99   Thus, the 
case included in this study offers significant variation in the belligerents’ stakes in the 
outcome of the war.   
Fifth, a case of asymmetric war has been chosen.  The case involves one 
militarily stronger power (United States) and one militarily weaker power (the 
Philippines).  Asymmetric wars inherently involve one belligerent with a greater level 
of reserves than the other and therefore are a fertile testing ground for hypotheses H1, 
H6, H7.  Because of the power differential, asymmetric wars are also well-suited to 
testing of the hypotheses related to the strategies used by belligerents (H2-H5).    I 
                                                     
97 Goemans, “Fighting for Survival”; Goemans, “War and Punishment”. 
98 See Slantchev, “How Initiators,” 819. 
99 Ibid. 
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also have chosen this case based on an a priori assumption that in cases of 
asymmetric war, the resolve of the smaller power will be an important factor in war 
termination and any negotiation of settlement terms.  Taking into account resolve 
provides the opportunity to test hypothesis H8’s prediction that the negotiating 
behavior of belligerents will affect settlement terms.   
The case of the Philippine-American War has been selected for this study 
based on the above criteria.  The selection criteria are not formulated based on the 
alternative hypotheses suggested by domestic politics approaches, organizational 
theory, psychological theory, constructivism, or critical theory.  I recognize the 
limitations of my research design and argue that this investigation, as formulated, 
provides a sufficiently hard test of the bargaining model.  Should the bargaining 
model find support in this thesis, further study will be necessary to access the breadth 
and depth of the model’s validity. 
The Remainder of the Thesis 
   The first case study chapter (Chapter 3) is an account of the war as seen 
through the theoretical lenses of the bargaining model.  The bargaining model 
account begins by identifying the belligerents along the dimensions of war aims, 
regime type, the stakes of the war, and the relative balance of military capabilities 
between belligerents.  A brief description of any negotiations or military posturing 
directly antecedent to the outbreak of war follows. Next is an examination of the 
episodes of battle and negotiation throughout the course of the war.  In accordance 
with the bargaining model, the accounts of battle and negotiation utilize evidence 
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emphasized by the model’s hypotheses and expected observations.  Additionally, in 
the bargaining model chapter, belligerents are treated as unitary actors.  At the end of 
this first section, the explanatory and predictive power of the bargaining model is 
assessed against the evidence from the war. 
 The second case study (Chapter 4) is offered from the perspective of the 
alternative hypotheses and expectations.  This account is provided using evidence 
emphasized by the alternative hypotheses or expected observations.  This chapter is 
subdivided into portions corresponding with constructivism/critical theory, political 
psychology, domestic politics, and organization theory.  The bargaining model 
account is not reiterated in this chapter but rather any new details are pointed out.  
The goal is to uncover any gaps in the bargaining model account and if gaps are 
found, to offer new insight into the events and outcomes of the war.  Following the 
alternative perspectives chapter, this thesis is concluded with an assessment of the 
bargaining model in light of any insights provided by the alternative perspectives.
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Chapter 3: The Philippine-American War, 1899-1902 
Introduction 
 In 2003, just over a century after the termination of the Philippine-American 
War, the United States begins fighting a war in Iraq with striking similarities to the 
earlier Philippines war.  As one may find in reading this chapter, there are clear 
parallels between the Philippine-American War and the 2003 Iraq War.  Like the 
Philippine-American War, the war in Iraq begins with conventional warfare but later 
transitions into guerrilla warfare and terrorism. Also like the Philippines, Iraq is a 
state with numerous ethnic divisions.  Although there are further instances of 
similarities, one may also see in the case of the Philippine-American War that there 
are differences between the two conflicts.  Despite the differences, the commonalities 
between these two wars may make more important an understanding of the process 
by which the Philippine-American War was ended.  In better understanding the 
causes and processes of war termination in the case of the Philippines, one might 
better answer the question being asked around the world at the time of this writing: 
“When will the Iraq war end?” 
The study in this chapter analyzes the case of the Philippine-American War, 
1899-1902.  The hypotheses and expected observations generated by the bargaining 
model of war termination are tested for validity.  In addition to hypothesis testing, the 
study in this chapter aims to capture the interaction effects between and among 
independent variables.  The evidence is also examined in order to gauge the 
predictive and explanatory power of a single hypothesis relative to the other 
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hypotheses.  To undertake these examinations and tests the process-tracing methods 
described in the second chapter are employed.  
The Bargaining Model Account 
Initial Status 
 The relationship between the United States and the Philippines grew in 
importance with the Spanish-American War of 1898.  The United States victory over 
the Spanish navy near Manila, the Philippine’s capital, put the US in a position to 
wrest the Philippine archipelago from Spain.1  However, Filipino revolutionaries had 
taken advantage of US assistance and the Spanish-American War, expanded 
occupation of interior areas of the Philippines, and seized weapons from abandoned 
Spanish garrisons as they went.   
Regime Type 
On 23 May 1898, General Emilio Aguinaldo declared himself dictator of the 
independent Philippine Republic.2  Despite Aguinaldo’s claim to the title of dictator, 
the title was an inaccurate representation of Aguinaldo’s actual control in the 
Philippines.  Aguinaldo exercised power through a government was limited to the 
Filipino elite.3  Given, his incomplete control over the tools of state coercion and the 
                                                     
1 John M. Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags, (London: Greenwood P, Inc., 1973), 4; Brian M. Linn, The Philippine War, 1899-
1902, (Lawrence: Kansas UP, 2000), 3-5.  
2 Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags, 15-18; Linn, The Philippine War, 1899-1902, 21, 22. 
3 Linn, “The Philippine,” 34, 35.  While the Filipino government  had a constitution establishing some democratic institutions, 
both the limiting of participation to the elite and Aguinaldo’s dictatorial rule by decree  support classification of the Philippine 
Republic as a mixed authoritarian regime rather either a democracy or dictatorship.  See James Lee Ray, Democracy and 
International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition, (Columbia: South Carolina UP, 1995), 115. 
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exclusion from the policymaking process of all but the Filipino elite, Aguinaldo’s 
regime more closely fit the description of mixed authoritarian.4   
In contrast to the qualification required to classify the Filipino regime, 
categorizing the US regime was much clearer.  The US was a consolidated 
democratic regime.  Specifically, throughout the war the US government was headed 
by William McKinley’s administration.5 
War Aims and Stakes of the War 
 The war aims of the US included occupation of the entire archipelago and 
recognition of US sovereignty over the Philippines.6  In exchange for recognition of 
US sovereignty, the Americans offered to protect the individual and property rights of 
the Filipinos.7  As a war for a colonial possession, the bargaining model points out 
that the stakes of the war were low for the US.8   
The Philippine Republic’s war aims were simple: US recognition of an 
independent and sovereign Philippine Republic.9 According to the bargaining model, 
the Philippines’ stakes were also very stark.  As a belligerent led by a mixed 
authoritarian regime fighting for both national independence and regime survival, the 
stakes of the war were high. 
Balance of Military Capabilities    
                                                     
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., 7, 42. 
6 Gates, “Schoolbooks,” 21, 34; Glenn A. May, “Why the United States Won the Philippine-American War, 1899-1902” The 
Pacific Historical Review 52.4 (1983), 355; Linn, “The Philippine,” 30, 36. 
7 Gates, “Schoolbooks,” 25, 55-62. 
8 Branislav L. Slantchev, “How Initiators End Their Wars: the Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace.” American Journal 
of Political Science 48.4(2004): 813-829. 
9 Gates, “Schoolbooks,” 22-23. Linn, “The Philippine,” 36. 
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Estimates regarding the initial strength of the Philippine Republic’s “Army of 
Liberation” range from as few as 15,000 to as many as 30,000 or 40,000 regular 
soldiers.10 The Army of Liberation was tough, mobile, and its main force of soldiers 
had been largely well armed with captured Mauser rifles.  Furthermore, many of the 
Filipino soldiers had been veterans of the revolutionary efforts against Spain.   In 
addition to the regular forces in the Army of Liberation, the Filipino forces included 
armed and organized militias. 11  
Despite the ostensible strength of the Filipino forces an important caveat must 
be noted.   Even though Filipino forces had occupied interior portions of the 
archipelago, the quality arms, veteran status, toughness, and mobility that 
characterized part of the Army of Liberation were not representative of the entire 
Filipino force.  Lack of training, quality weaponry, and weak command and control 
afflicted some segments of the Filipino forces (especially the militias).12   
To counter Filipino forces in the ensuing war were US forces consisting of 
19,000 troops referred to as the 8th Corps with support of modern naval warships.13  
The 8th Corps benefited from new technology and doctrine.  Technology had provided 
modern bolt-action, repeating rifles (.30 caliber Krag-Jogensen), machine guns, and 
field artillery.  Innovations in doctrine came from Civil and Indian War experiences 
which inspired pacification doctrine (General Order 100) and called for benevolence 
to peaceful segments of an occupied territory but harsh treatment for hostile groups 
                                                     
10Gates, “Schoolbooks”, 4; Linn, “The Philippine” , 1899-1902, 61-62. 
11 Linn, “The Philippine”, 42, 61-62. 
12 Ibid., 34, 35. 
13 Ibid., 7, 42. 
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and individuals.  Frontier fighting and the Indian Wars also bequeathed to the 
Regulars efficient small-unit tactics well suited to irregular war.  However, the US 
forces were hampered by a lack of prior planning for occupation of the Philippines 
and were therefore poorly prepared and subject to lacking intelligence capabilities in 
the Philippines.14 
In addition to the forces already marshalled by both belligerents at the onset of 
war, it is important to consider the balance of reserves.  In this regard, the US clearly 
had the advantage.  As a populous and industrializing state with superiority in 
quantity of human, natural, and technological resources, the US possessed more 
potential to mobilize additional resources for war.15   
Expected Processes and Outcomes 
If the expected observations and hypotheses of the bargaining model are 
correct, then there are general observations of processes and outcomes that should be 
evident in the case of the Philippine-American War.  First, if expected observation 
one (O1) is correct, then there will be (possibly delayed) negotiations between the 
Philippine and US governments during the war.  Expected observation two (O2) 
suggests that the US and Philippines may alter their demanded settlement terms if 
they are successful or unsuccessful in battle and/or negotiation and the final 
settlement terms will reflect the balance of military capabilities and resolve.  
                                                     
14 Ibid., 8-12. 
15 This description of reserves is not derived from the sources used in this case study.  However, as a depiction of the balance of 
reserves between the US and Philippines, the description is reasonable.  Additionally, the historical source materials corroborate 
a conclusion that the US had greater reserves. See Gates, “Schoolbooks.”; Linn, “The Philippine.”  
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The balance of military capabilities between the US and Philippine forces 
requires some explanation before related expected observations and hypotheses can 
be discussed.  Though the Army of Liberation’s manpower may have initially 
exceeded that of the US Army, the US Army was generally better armed, trained and 
commanded.  Furthermore, the military forces of the US were supplemented by naval 
power.  One must also consider the fact that, in part through superior reserves, the US 
had the ability to re-supply and replenish its forces while the Filipinos were 
effectively prevented from acquiring outside resources.16  Considering the ostensibly 
more powerful military capabilities of the US (especially a more favorable balance of 
reserves), hypothesis one (H1) predicts that the US will consistently demand more 
favorable settlement terms than the Philippines during and at the conclusion of the 
war.   
However, the strategies employed by the US and Filipino militaries should 
affect the efficacy of each belligerent’s military capabilities.  According to hypothesis 
two (H2), if both the US and Philippine militaries fight using direct strategies, then 
the Philippine Republic will suffer higher relative rates of loss in battle.  If, however, 
the Filipinos adopt an indirect strategy and the US forces fight using a direct strategy, 
then hypothesis three (H3) predicts that the US will suffer higher relative rates of loss 
in battle.  Still another possibility is predicted by hypothesis four (H4): if the US 
employs an indirect strategy and the Filipinos use a direct strategy, then the US will 
suffer higher relative rates of loss in battle.  On the other hand, hypothesis five (H5) 
                                                     
16 See Gates, “Schoolbooks”; Linn, “The Philippine.” 
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predicts that if the US and Philippine militaries both confront each other using 
indirect strategies, then the Philippines will suffer higher relative rates of loss in 
battle. 
The outcomes of battles should also have an observable effect on the 
belligerents’ settlement terms.  Based on hypothesis six (H6), one might expect that if 
either the US or Philippine Republic forces suffers a higher relative loss rate than the 
other, the ‘losing’ belligerent will moderate its settlement terms.  In contrast, 
hypothesis seven (H7) predicts that the ‘winning’ belligerent will not moderate its 
settlement terms and may even increase its demands.   
In addition to the expectations derived from H1, H6, and H7, belligerents’ 
negotiating behavior should also impact settlement terms.  Therefore hypothesis eight 
(H8) predicts that if in negotiations the Philippine Republic (or US) refuses to 
moderate its settlement terms, then the US (or Philippine Republic) will moderate its 
own settlement terms.  However, several factors should affect the resolve of the US 
and Philippines in negotiations. First, given mixed authoritarian regime leading the 
Philippine Republic, hypotheses nine and eleven (H9 and H11) lead to the 
expectation that the Philippines will exhibit a higher level of resolve than the 
democratic US.  H9 gives rise to the expectation that the Philippines will refuse to 
moderate its settlement terms even if it faces outright military defeat.  Given that H11 
is correct, the US will moderate its terms if it suffers a higher rate of battle losses than 
the Philippines.   If, however, the US inflicts higher rates of battle losses on the 
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Philippine Republic, then O3 predicts that, in order to more quickly end the war, the 
US will not increase its demands.17   
The stakes of the war for the Philippines and US should also affect the resolve 
of the belligerents.  The stakes discussed above offer other expectations about what 
should be observed in the case study.  Because for the Philippine Republic, the stakes 
of the war are high, hypothesis twelve (H12) suggests that the Philippines will refuse 
to moderate its settlement terms even if it faces outright military defeat in prolonged 
fighting.  Given the low stakes of the war for the US, H14 predicts that the US will 
dramatically moderate or forsake its settlement terms if it suffers higher rates of battle 
losses than the Philippine Republic. These predictions about the Philippine-American 
War will be tested against the evidence.   
One must reiterate that there are challenging questions presented by the 
hypotheses of the bargaining model.  Among the challenges briefly discussed in the 
second chapter, the hypotheses do not specify whether or when the causal impact of 
the resolve variables is greater than, less than, or equal to the causal impact of 
military capabilities variables.  The hypotheses also do not specify the relative impact 
on resolve of regime type, the stakes of the war, etcetera.  Perhaps in the case study, 
tentative answers to these challenging questions will be provided.  The case study 
                                                     
17 Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner argue that because resolve and military capabilities are both components of bargaining 
leverage, win or lose, democratic belligerents will receive less favorable settlement terms than would a belligerent of a different 
regime type in the same circumstances.  This is due to the cost sensitivity of democracies.  Rather than continuing to fight in 
hopes of gain more favorable concessions in a war, democratic belligerents, Filson and Werner argue the democracies will 
accept less favorable terms in order to avoid continued war.  See Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner, “Bargaining and Fighting: 
The Impact of Regime Type on War Onset, Duration, and Outcomes.” American Journal of Political Science 48.2(2004): 296-
313. 
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begins with the pre-war negotiations between the US and the Philippines and 
progresses through each stage of the war to the final agreement terminating the war. 
Preliminary Negotiations   
When the US defeated the Spanish navy at Manila, the Philippine Republic 
expected US support for the Filipino revolutionaries.  Conversely, the US government 
expected Filipino allegiance and support.  Both Filipino and American forces took 
action to occupy the capital city of Manila and the US ordered that America would 
not tolerate a joint Filipino-American occupation of Manila. On 12 August 1898 the 
US 8th Corps took possession of the city while the Philippine Republic’s Army of 
Liberation surrounded Manila.18  Tensions grew despite negotiations.  Filipino and 
American forces shored up their positions in and around Manila in preparation for 
war.  Six more negotiation meetings occurred in January 1899, but neither side 
moderated its settlement terms and, as a result, negotiations remained at an impasse.19  
   In short, negotiation was made a dead letter by the inability of the Philippine 
Republic and the United States to reach a compromise settlement between the 
Filipino demand for independence and the US demand that its sovereignty in the 
Philippines be recognized.  Thus, the stage had been set for the outbreak of the 
Philippine-American War.20   
The Conventional War Period 
Battle for Manila    
                                                     
18 Gates, “Schoolbooks,” 19-42; Linn, “The Philippine,” 21, Ch. 2.  
19 Gates, “Schoolbooks,” 33-42.  
20 Gates, “Schoolbooks, 4-7, 16-42; Linn, “The Philippine,” 3-7, 21, Ch. 2. 
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In the Battle for Manila, on the 4th and 5th of February 1899, the US Army, 
with assistance in the form of naval bombardment, extended the American-controlled 
territory around Manila.  This was the largest single battle of the war.  The US forces 
suffered approximately 200 wounded and between 44 and 59 killed while the Filipino 
Army of Liberation had taken 4,000 casualties with between 500 and 700 killed; a 
further 500 Filipino soldiers were captured.  The battle was a decisive victory for the 
Americans and the Philippine Republic suffered a much greater rate of loss relative to 
the US.21   
Fighting continued during the remainder of February 1899.  The US 
continuously defeated Filipinos in engagements with regular troops.22  The battle for 
Manila had occurred at the peak of Aguinaldo’s military power.23  The results of 
Aguinaldo’s defeat included the loss of “irreplaceable rifles, cannon, ammunition, 
and supplies” and led the Philippines’ chief general Antonio Luna to remark, “Our 
enemies are too strong and superior in means.”24  As Aguinaldo’s top general, Luna’s 
remark is important in demonstrating support for the bargaining model’s assumption 
that battle provides accurate information with which belligerents update their beliefs 
about relative military capabilities.  The battles during February also provide 
confirmation for H2’s prediction that when a militarily weaker belligerent using a 
direct strategy confronts a strong belligerent using a direct strategy, the weaker 
belligerent will suffer higher relative rates of loss. 
                                                     
21 Gates, “Schoolbooks,” 76-78; Linn, “The Philippine,” 42-56. 
22 Gates, “Schoolbooks,” 79; Linn, “The Philippine,” 55-64. 
23 Linn, “The Philippine,” 61-62. 
24 Ibid., 61-63. 
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 War across the Archipelago 
Soon after the battles for Manila, the US ratified the treaty ending the war 
with Spain, and as a result, some units within the 8th Corps were to be sent back to the 
United States.  This was soon to reduce the US forces to only 11,000 combat-ready 
troops.  However, some of the soldiers in the units returning to the US offered to 
remain until their replacements arrived.  Meanwhile the Army of Liberation had a 
growing force of 30,000 regulars and an unknown number of militia, with the troops 
and arms concentrated mostly on Luzon.  However, the Filipino forces were only 
armed with a total of between 25,000 and 35,000 firearms and also had shortages in 
ammunition and artillery.  As a consequence of this power balance on the 
archipelago, the US ability to go on the offensive was limited, but its defensive 
capability was sufficient to keep Aguinaldo’s forces confined to the interior areas of 
the Philippine islands.25  
Despite limited offensive capabilities, the US 8th Corps undertook operations 
both to disrupt the Army of Liberation and to gain footholds in other parts of the 
Philippines.26    On 16 March 1899, 1,000 Filipino soldiers attacked Iloilo, a city 
recently captured by US forces.  While suffering one soldier killed and fourteen 
wounded, the Americans killed between 50 and 200 of the 1,000 attacking Filipinos.  
The battle at Iloilo again supports the prediction of H2 that the Filipino forces would 
suffer higher relative rates of loss as long as both sides used direct strategies.         
The Conventional War on Luzon 
                                                     
25 Gates, “Schoolbooks,” 78-80.  
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 US forces had fought to gain more footholds by occupying key ports in other 
parts of the Philippines.  Filipino forces responded by occupying interior areas and 
surrounding the positions held by the American forces garrisoning the ports.27  The 
US realized that it would be necessary to achieve victory in Luzon, the location of the 
bulk of the Army of Liberation’s forces and the site of the Philippine Republic capital 
city, Malolos.28 
Northern Luzon  
In the spring of 1899, US forces began a campaign to trap and defeat the 
Army of Liberation in northern Luzon and capture the Philippine Republic capital of 
Malolos.29  The offensive into northern Luzon began 25 March 1899.  The US failed 
to trap the Army of Liberation or capture the Philippine Republic government, but 
succeeded in inflicting upon the Philippines the loss of experienced soldiers, 
irreplaceable Mausers, precious ammunition, supplies, and money. 30   
From the spring to fall of 1899, US reinforcements began arriving and, by the 
fall of 1899, 70,000 US soldiers were in the Philippines.  The US took advantage of 
the enlarged 8th Corps and launched another attempt to capture the Army of 
Liberation.  On 11 April, in anticipation of another US campaign, and in hopes of 
dampening the US offensive capability, the Filipino forces attacked US garrisons on 
Luzon.  In spite of the Filipino attacks, the offensive began on 23 April.  The main 
battle of the second US offensive in northern Luzon occurred at Calumpit.  The Army 
                                                     
27 Gates, “Schoolbooks,” 79, 80. 
28 Linn, “The Philippine,” 88. 
29 Ibid., 88-93.  
30 Gates, “Schoolbooks,” 110-112; Linn, “The Philippine,” 95-100. 
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of Liberation benefited from natural and manmade defensive positions in addition to 
having a large force of 7,000 soldiers.  However, when the US army attacked the 
Army of Liberation at Calumpit, the Filipino defenses failed and within three days the 
Americans had defeated the Filipino forces.31  Yet again, the battles between the 
Army of Liberation and the reinforced US Army support the prediction of H2 that the 
Filipinos would suffer higher rates of losses than the Americans as long as both sides 
employed direct strategies.32   
First Round Intra-War Negotiations 
On 28 April, in the aftermath of defeat, the Philippine Republic requested “a 
three-week armistice to…discuss terms.”33  The US rejected the Philippines’ request, 
and refused a truce until the Army of Liberation had disarmed.  On 2 May, the 
Philippine Republic offered a three month cease-fire with a subtle stipulation that the 
United States recognize Philippine independence.  The US again rejected the Filipino 
offer and this time made a counteroffer that the Philippine Republic accept Filipino 
civil government under US sovereignty and the US policy of benevolent assimilation.  
However, the Philippine Republic rejected the US terms.  Consequently, negotiations 
collapsed and the US offensive resumed.34  
The inter-belligerent communications and negotiations following the defeat of 
the Philippine Republic’s Army of Liberation by the US military are quite instructive.  
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The evidence offers both confirmation and disconfirmation of the bargaining model.  
Generally supported hypotheses/expected observations will be discussed before 
disconfirmed hypotheses.   
First, O1 is supported: negotiations occur during the course of the war but are 
delayed until after a series of battles had been fought.  Second, H1 also finds 
confirmation.  The belligerent with greater reserves, the US, demands more favorable 
terms than the Philippine Republic.  The Philippine Republic demands only that it be 
granted recognition as an independent state.  The Philippines makes no demands that 
would ask the US to do anything more than cede its control over a recently obtained 
colonial possession.  In contrast, the US is demanding the Philippine Republic cede 
both independence and at least some measure of the regime’s control over its own 
state/territory. 
Third, the US rejection of any offer to negotiate that did not include 
disarmament of the Philippine military reflects what H7 predicted would result if the 
US inflicted on the Philippine Republic a higher relative rate of losses.35   However, 
contra H7 the US moderates its settlement terms by allowing a measure of self-
governance for the Philippines.  Recall that the original settlement terms only 
communicated to the Filipinos that they must accept US sovereignty over the 
archipelago.  Though this moderation runs counter to H7, such moderation is in line 
with the prediction of O3 that even when militarily successful, the democratic US 
                                                     
35 Again, though body counts and tabulations of lost/destroyed materiel are not complete enough to provide a clear ratio of 
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would moderate its settlement terms in order to end a war rather than fight on for 
higher gains.  The fluctuation of settlement terms during these negotiations also 
provides confirmation of expected observation two (O2).   
Fourth, regarding the effects of regime type and the stakes of the war, H9 and 
H12 are confirmed.  The unwillingness of the mixed authoritarian Philippine 
Republic to moderate its demands or accept the unfavorable terms offered by the US 
supports H9.  In turn, H12 is supported by the Philippines’ refusal to moderate its 
demands by disarming or abandoning its demand for independence (despite incurring 
a higher rate of losses relative to the US, the Philippine Republic was steadfast in its 
demands.)     
Despite support for some hypotheses, H6 and H8 are challenged by the 
evidence (though H8 is only partially questioned).  H6 predicts that because the 
Philippine Republic was suffering losses at a greater rate than US, the Philippines 
would moderate its settlement terms.  Yet, in spite of its military defeats, the 
Philippines refused to moderate its terms.  However, the disconfirmation of H6 is 
explained by the confirmation of H9.  Given that the government of the Philippine 
Republic is a mixed authoritarian regime, H9 is shown to have more predictive power 
than H6 in regards to the behavior of the Philippines.     
In considering H8, it is important to note two events.  In the first instance, 
when the US rejected the Philippines’ armistice offer, the Philippine Republic 
countered with an altered, but not necessarily moderated, offer.  This may provide a 
challenge to H8.  However, Philippine Republic mixed authoritarian regime may also 
  
 
 
 83 
account for this challenge to H8.  In the second instance, the US rejected the 
unmoderated Filipino counteroffer but indicated a new allowance for Filipino self-
government that had not been part of previous settlement terms.  This second 
negotiation event appears to support H8.  In sum, H6 receives disconfirmation while 
H8 receives a mix of confirmation and disconfirmation.  
Resumption of Battle 
Returning to the case, one finds that the renewed US offensive reduced the 
Army of Liberation to small disorganized units capable only of harassment against 
American forces.  The Filipinos lost scarce firearms and their relocated capital at San 
Isidro was captured.36  The Filipino forces had suffered “a series of smashing blows” 
but the Philippine Republic’s forces had not been totally destroyed.37  Though the 
Philippine military was not completely defeated, the outcome of resumed battle 
between the US and Philippines serves to again reinforce the confirmation of H2. 
H2’s prediction that the US would inflict higher relative rates of loss on the 
Philippines as long as both the American and Filipino forces fought using direct 
strategies is clearly bourne out by the evidence. 
Southern Luzon 
 While some US forces were engaged in the campaigns of northern Luzon, 
other US soldiers were undertaking operations in Luzon’s south.  In early April 1899, 
US forces captured a major Filipino supply center.  The attack on the supply center 
resulted in 93 Filipino soldiers killed at a cost to the US forces of 1 soldier killed and 
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9 wounded.   In other campaigns taking place into the summer of 1899, the US 
secured more extensive lines and strategic points and forced the Philippines to divert 
much needed forces from northern Luzon.38  Once more, H2 is confirmed by the 
continued US victories and favorable loss rates in the battles fought using 
conventional (direct) warfare strategies. 
Fall Offensive of 1899  
Reinforcements for the 8th Corps were arriving from the United States and the 
US naval blockade of the Philippines had managed to isolate Filipino forces on each 
island and prevent communications, supply efforts, and troop movements.39  At the 
same time US power in the Philippines was in the ascendant, the Philippine Republic 
continued to experience a decline in power.  Among its political woes, the Philippine 
Republic had been forced to continually move its capital. One consequence of the 
Philippines’ political trouble was that only “confused efforts to resume peace 
negotiations” with the US occurred.40  The military decline of the Philippine Republic 
also continued.  Logistical constraints had reduced the Army of Liberation to 4,000 
soldiers and command and control problems further exacerbated the decline in troop 
strength.41 
From a position of strength in the fall of 1899, the US launched another 
offensive in an attempt to capture the Army of Liberation and quash resistance on 
Luzon.  America’s stated goal of the fall offensive was to capture the Army of 
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Liberation in order to prevent it from beginning a guerrilla war.  The US army failed 
to capture the Army of Liberation but the American forces killed and captured 
hundreds of Filipino soldiers. Perhaps even more importantly, US soldiers seized 
artillery, captured vast amounts of supplies, and in one case, destroyed an 
irreplaceable arsenal containing 200 rifles and 60,000 rounds of ammunition.42  
Again, H2 is supported by the higher rates of loss inflicted by the US on the 
Philippines during the conventional phase of the war.  
Making matters worse, the Army of Liberation began losing forces through 
the surrender or desertion of high-ranking officers and soldiers.43   In the process, 
some surrendered themselves along with scarce ammunition and irreplaceable rifles 
to the US forces.   At least some of the motivation for surrender can be discerned as a 
belief that US military capabilities were superior to those of the Philippine Republic.  
For example, Brian Linn states that Filipino General Daniel Tirona “decided 
resistance was futile, and on 11 December he surrendered 1,200 precious rifles and all 
the forces in Isabella and Cagayan Provinces.”44  This lends support to the bargaining 
model assumption that battle outcomes lead to belief updating. 
The Guerrilla War Period 
As a result of the offensives into northern Luzon, the Army of Liberation was 
no longer capable of continuing a conventional war.  On 13 November 1899, the 
Army of Liberation disbanded and the practice of guerrilla warfare was officially 
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adopted.  For its part, the US capitalized on its victory and expanded the areas under 
American occupation.45  The US continued to capture rifles and proportionally large 
quantities of ammunition totaling over 10,000 rounds.  American forces kept up 
pressure on the Filipino forces and dispersed them as the US continually expanded its 
area of control.46   
The Early Stages 
   Generals of the Philippine Republic’s Army of Liberation assumed control of 
guerrilla districts and used tactics of harassment, ambushes, traps, and sabotage to 
increase the cost of American occupation and wear down the US forces.47  The 
Filipino’s adoption of guerrilla warfare met with early success.  American soldiers 
were forced to respond to guerrilla efforts.48  The guerrilla war had soon inflicted 
more casualties than the previous conventional war.49  The success of the Filipino 
forces employing an indirect (guerrilla) strategy against the US military’s direct 
(conventional) strategy supports the prediction derived from H3: the militarily weaker 
belligerent using an indirect strategy should inflict higher relative loss rates on a 
militarily stronger belligerent employing a direct strategy.  Admittedly, it is not 
entirely clear that the Philippine forces actually did inflict more losses than they 
suffered.  Nevertheless, the evidence does suggest that the US was suffering a greater 
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rate of loss than the Philippines.50   The success of guerrilla warfare peaked in 1900.  
During the early guerrilla phase, the Philippine Republic inflicted heavy casualties on 
US forces.  However, the US military soon responded to the Filipino guerrillas with a 
counter-guerrilla campaign.51   
US persistence, despite suffering greater losses compared to those of the 
Filipino guerillas, challenges H6’s prediction that the US would moderate its 
settlement terms if experiencing a higher rate of losses than the Philippines.  
Furthermore, continued fighting by the US with no moderation of settlement terms 
disconfirms H11 and H14.  As a democratic state fighting a low stakes war, the US 
should have attempted to exit the war by dramatically moderating or perhaps 
forsaking its demands after the early success of the Filipino guerilla war.  
Additionally, contrary to H7’s predictions, the Philippine Republic did not capitalize 
on its successful guerilla strategy by seeking more favorable terms from the US.  In 
fact, despite the bargaining model expectation that belligerents will negotiate (O1), 
negotiations between the Philippine Republic and the US were notably absent during 
the guerrilla war. 
The Later Stages 
  In mid-November and December 1900, the US adopted a much harsher 
strategy of pacification designed to retaliate against the Filipino resistance and, more 
importantly, to separate the guerrillas from their support base in the Filipino 
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population.52  The changed American approach to making war on the Filipino 
guerrillas included several new tactics.  US forces began to consider many of the 
guerrillas to be irregular combatants that did not have to be treated as prisoners of 
war.  This change in the official status regarded to Filipino guerrillas allowed policies 
such as holding prisoners for a ransom of weapons and information or even executing 
Filipino prisoners.  Guerrilla supporters and sympathizers were also arrested.  
Furthermore, when American forces captured civil and military leaders of the 
Philippine Republic, the leaders were deported to Guam.53 Another tactic was to pay 
Filipino informants “liberally” for any intelligence provided to the US forces.  The 
resulting improvement in intelligence gathering led to many arrests, including those 
of resistance officers.54  In addition to buying information, the US also reformed its 
intelligence gathering apparatus and was able to identify guerrillas when they entered 
populated areas and forced the Filipino resistance into isolation.55  The shift in US 
strategies is one of an abandonment of a direct, conventional strategy in favor of an 
indirect, counterinsurgency strategy.56 
  In addition to adopting improved and harsher means of waging the war, the 
US also exerted pressure on the guerrillas simply by increasing their presence across 
the Philippines.  The number of garrisons was increased from 400 to 502; this 
allowed the US to occupy every important locality and strategic location, and to block 
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access to the trails utilized by guerrillas.57  American soldiers used their increased 
presence to launch offensive operations that prevented guerrillas from resting or 
regrouping.  American soldiers also initiated round-ups in which Filipino males of 
military age were detained to prevent their participation in guerrilla activities.  US 
operations also destroyed the food and supplies in the interior areas of the Philippines 
and thereby deprived the guerrillas of the basic means to live much less wage war.58   
In some cases, the US forces concentrated civilians in US occupied towns or 
protected zones.  Filipinos found outside of the occupied towns were treated as 
enemies to the American forces.  The concentration of the population served purposes 
valuable to the US military.  First, the tactic of concentration prevented the guerrillas 
from obtaining food, aid, or intelligence.  Second, it aided American soldiers in 
locating Filipino guerrillas.59  The success of the indirect strategy employed by the 
militarily more powerful US to counter the indirect strategy utilized by the militarily 
less powerful Philippines provides support for H5.  The US had clearly reversed the 
early trend of the initial phase of the guerrilla war.  Again, though exact figures are 
unavailable, the evidence suggests that the Philippines’ forces were suffering more 
losses than they were inflicting on the Americans.  
Toward Termination of the War 
Cut off from their support base, and continually pursued by US forces, the 
guerrillas found themselves without rest, weapons, and food.  The Filipino guerrillas 
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were also continually being dispersed into smaller and smaller units.  The thorough 
and harsh new strategy of the US forces eliminated the guerrillas as an effective 
military force, and reduced their activities to very limited forms of terrorism.  
Furthermore, as US control solidified, even terrorism became an ineffective tool with 
which to continue resistance.  Under these conditions, Filipino commanders, officers, 
and rank-and-file soldiers increasingly surrendered or simply ceased fighting.60   
 In addition to the combination of US military operations, which had left the 
guerrillas isolated, hungry, and often unarmed, war termination was brought closer 
after Aguinaldo was captured on 14 March 1901.  Shortly after his capture, 
Aguinaldo called for all remaining Filipino forces to surrender and accept US 
sovereignty. More Filipino soldiers and leaders answered his call by surrendering to 
US forces.61  Some guerrilla leaders and their units continued to fight after 
Aguinaldo’s capture, but the continued use of proven counter-guerrilla tactics led to 
the capture or surrender of the last major guerrilla units by 16 April 1902 and the 
subsequent surrender of the last organized resistance.62  On 4 July 1902, President 
Theodore Roosevelt declared the war to be over and transferred the US territory of 
the Philippines from military to civilian control.63   
 The fact that the Philippine Republic abandoned its demands only after the 
capture of Aguinaldo supports H9.  H9 predicts that the Philippine Republic would 
refuse to moderate its settlement terms even if it faced outright military defeat in 
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continued battle.  Thus, H9 is confirmed because the Philippine Republic acceded to 
US demands only after the capture of Aguinaldo and actual defeat of remaining hold-
out forces.  The manner of the war’s termination also adds further support for O3.  
Despite the clear military victory by American forces, the US did not increase its 
demands by means such as adding punitive measures. 
Analysis  
An appraisal of the hypotheses and expected observations 
In examining the case of the Philippine-American War, the pertinent 
predictions and hypotheses derived from the bargaining model of war termination 
find a mixture of confirmation and disconfirmation.  First, the prediction of expected 
observation one (O1), that belligerents negotiate settlement terms for war termination 
during the war, finds support.64  However, one should note that negotiations between 
the belligerents were markedly absent during the guerrilla war period.  Second, 
expected observation two (O2) finds confirmation in the fluctuation of settlement 
terms during negotiations following the Filipino defeat in battle at Calumpit.65 
Material Hypotheses 
Linked to the confirmation of O2 is support for the first material hypothesis, 
H1.  As predicted by H1, the belligerent with greater levels of reserves, the US 
demanded more favorable settlement terms than the Philippine Republic.  In addition, 
clear confirmation was found for hypotheses H2, H3, and H5 (H4 was not applicable 
to this case).  When both the US and Philippine militaries fought using a direct 
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strategy, as predicted by H2, the Philippine Republic suffered higher relative rates of 
loss in battle.  However, after the Filipinos adopted an indirect strategy and the US 
forces continued to fight using a direct strategy, the fact that the Filipino army was 
able to have military success offers support for H3.  In turn, H5 is confirmed by the 
battle successes achieved by the US after employing an indirect strategy to counter 
the Filipinos’ use of an indirect strategy.   
In contrast to the clear confirmation of hypotheses H1, H2, H3, and H5, 
disconfirmation is doubly found for H6 while H7 receives mixed support.  H6 is first 
disconfirmed by the Philippine Republic’s refusal to moderate its terms during the 
negotiations after the battle at Calumpit.  Further disconfirming evidence is found in 
the refusal of the US to moderate its settlement terms after it experienced higher 
relative rates of loss during the initial period of guerrilla warfare.  On the other hand, 
H7 finds some support in the American rejection of the Philippine Republic’s offer 
during negotiations following the battle of Calumpit.  Yet, in the same period, the US 
moderats its demands despite having inflicted more losses on the Philippines than the 
Philippines had inflicted on the US.  Thus, the negotiation behavior of the US offers 
evidence that both supports and challenges H7.  Lastly, H7 is challenged by the 
absence of a Filipino attempt to exploit the Philippine Republic’s successful guerilla 
strategy by seeking moderated terms from the US. 
Negotiation Effects Hypothesis 
H8 captures the effects of negotiation by predicting that if one belligerent 
exhibits resolve by refusing to moderate its settlement terms, then the opposing 
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belligerent will moderate its own terms.  This hypothesis finds mixed support.  On the 
one hand, H8 is questioned by the US rejection of the Philippines’ terms and the 
Philippine Republic response of a reformulated, but unmoderated, offer.  On the other 
hand, H8 receives some support when the US rejected the Philippines’ unmoderated 
counterproposal but moderated American demands by offering a new allowance some 
for Filipino self-government.  In short, the effects of negotiation behavior on 
settlement terms are not clear. 
 Regime Hypotheses 
Of the regime hypotheses, only H9 and H11 are applicable to this case.  H9 
predicts that as a belligerent led by a mixed authoritarian regime, the Philippines 
would refuse to moderate its settlement terms even if faced with outright military 
defeat in continued battle.  H9 finds clear support.  In the negotiations following the 
battle at Calumpit, the Philippine Republic exhibited high resolve by refusing to 
moderate its settlement terms despite battlefield defeats at the hands of the US.  
Moreover, the Philippine Republic did not accept the American settlement terms until 
Aguinaldo was captured and the Philippines had been soundly defeated militarily.  
 Contrary to the support found for H9, the evidence from the Philippine-
American war disconfirms H11.  According to H11, the US, in an effort to extricate 
itself from the war, should have moderated its demands after the Philippine 
Republic’s military successes during the early period of the guerrilla war.  However, 
contra the prediction of H11, the US did not lessen its demands following the initial 
losses inflicted by the Filipino forces’ guerrilla strategy.  In sum, H9 receives clear 
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confirmation while H11 receives clear disconfirmation.  However, H11’s corollary, 
O3 is supported by US moderation at the negotiations following the Calumpit battle 
despite the previous military successes of the American forces.   
Stakes Hypotheses 
  Stakes hypotheses H12 and H14 are tested in this case and while H12 is 
confirmed, H14 is disconfirmed.  For the Philippine Republic, fighting for its 
independence and the survival of its regime, the stakes of the war are high. H12 
predicts that the Philippines would refuse to moderate its settlement terms even in the 
face of outright military defeat.  Therefore, H12 is supported by the Philippine 
Republic’s refusal to accept US settlement terms until Aguinaldo’s capture and the 
near total defeat of the Filipino military. 
Given the low stakes of the war, the US should have exhibited weak resolve.  
H14 predicts that the US would dramatically moderate or abandon its demands if it 
suffered a higher rate of loss relative to the Philippine Republic.  H14 is not 
confirmed by the evidence in this case study.  Despite the higher relative rate of loss 
incurred by the American forces, the US showed no sign of further moderating, much 
less forsaking, its demands on the Philippines.  Please see Table 3 in the Appendix for 
a summary assessment of the hypotheses tested in this case. 
An overall assessment of the bargaining model 
 Only nine of the fourteen hypotheses/expected observations applicable to 
Philippine-American War are confirmed.  Of the five remaining hypotheses, two 
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receive mixed support and three are disconfirmed.  What is to be made of the 
bargaining model based on these findings?   
 To begin, it appears that as a measure of military capabilities, a belligerent’s 
reserves relative to those of its adversary are a sound predictor of which belligerent 
will demand more favorable terms.  Furthermore, the strategies employed by 
belligerents are found to be a strong predictor of battle outcomes.  However, the 
disconfirmation of H6 and mixed findings for H7 cast doubt on the bargaining 
model’s assumption that belligerents update their beliefs and alter their settlement 
terms based on information received from battle outcomes.  Moreover, the mixed 
support for H8 questions the bargaining model’s assertion that information received 
at the bargaining table impacts belligerents’ beliefs and shapes their settlement terms.  
 The bargaining model may be able to answer some of these challenges.  First, 
part of the disconfirming evidence found for H6 and H8 can be accounted for by the 
predictions of H9 and H12 that the Philippine Republic would be unwilling to 
moderate its settlement terms even if continued war was likely to result in the 
Philippines’ outright military defeat.  Based on H9 and H12, it is no surprise that the 
Philippine Republic stood firm despite defeats in battle and US demands in 
negotiation.  Furthermore, US moderation at the post-Calumpit negotiations (which 
disconfirms H7) is explained by O3’s prediction that, in order to end war more 
quickly, democracies would be moderate even after military success.   
 However, some of the disconfirmation of H6 is not readily explained by the 
bargaining model.  Indeed, some disconfirmation of H6 makes the disconfirmation of 
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H11 and H14 all the more troubling for the model.  A lack of settlement term 
moderation by the US after the early Filipino success in guerilla war questions the 
predictions of H6 and H11.  Moreover, failure by the US to moderate at that point is 
quite disconfirming of H14.  According to H14, the US should have backed down in 
its settlement terms perhaps to the point of dropping its demands.  Therefore, revision 
is needed to address the bargaining model’s incorrect predictions about the behavior 
of democratic belligerents and belligerents fighting low stakes wars.   
 In sum, this account of the Philippine-American War has cast doubt on both 
the predictions of the bargaining model and the assumptions underlying its 
explanations of war termination.  In the following chapter, the black boxing of the 
unitary actor assumption is abandoned.  By removing the black box, the alternative 
perspectives of constructivism, critical theory, political psychology, and domestic 
politics can be applied to the Philippine-American War.  These alternative 
perspectives may shed analytical light on the shortcomings of the bargaining model’s 
predictions/explanations.  Perhaps they will highlight important variables and causal 
pathways in war termination processes that are missed by the bargaining model.  
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Chapter 4: Breaking Open the “Black Box” and Bounding the 
Rationality of the Bargaining Model 
Introduction 
 The bargaining model account of the Philippine-American War leaves one 
with an empirical puzzle.  In the first place, why did battle outcomes and negotiation 
not have the predicted effects?  While, as discussed in the previous chapter, the 
bargaining model can account for some of these empirical failings, other 
shortcomings are left unexplained.  Most apparent, a democratic belligerent – fighting 
a low stakes war and experiencing higher relative rates of loss – behaved in an 
unexpected manner by not making concessions or dropping demands in order to exit 
the war.  These empirical challenges to the bargaining model of war termination raise 
important questions about the validity of the model’s predictions. 
 In this chapter, the unitary rational actor assumptions of the bargaining model 
are set aside.  Instead, the alternative perspectives from constructivism, critical 
theory, political psychology, domestic politics/decision-making approaches, and 
organization theory are applied to the Philippine-American War.  The alternative 
hypotheses and expected observations suggested by these theories/approaches will be 
tested against the evidence.  Any evidence found in support of the alternative 
hypotheses/expected observations will be used to provide the missing pieces to the 
empirical puzzle left by the bargaining model account of the war.   In particular, the 
alternative hypotheses/expected observations will be employed in an effort to explain 
why some of the bargaining model hypotheses are disconfirmed. 
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 Explanations provided by the alternative perspectives may offer insight into 
the questions about the Philippine-American War left unanswered by the bargaining 
model.  However, the alternative perspectives may do more than explain what the 
bargaining model does not.  Recall that the alternative hypotheses/expected 
observations examined in this chapter are derived from theories and approaches that 
stand in stark contrast to the bargaining model’s unitary rational actor.  Consequently, 
one should not expect that the alternative perspectives will simply complement the 
bargaining model by filling in the empirical gaps or serving as residual explanations.  
Support found for the alternative hypotheses/expected observations may well 
undermine even the confirmed bargaining model hypotheses.  In the worst case for 
the bargaining model, the alternative perspectives may challenge the model’s core 
assumptions and causal mechanisms.    
Domestic Politics: Influence and Decision-making 
 Before proceeding to any of the other alternative perspectives, the insights 
from domestic politics must first be discussed.  In considering the domestic politics of 
the Philippines and the US during the war, the unitary actor assumptions of the 
bargaining model become apparently problematic.  In both the US and the Philippine 
Republic, moderate and hard-liner elites and decision-makers engaged in competition 
for the levers of policy-making.  Arguably, the outcomes of the competition in the 
two belligerents played a significant role in the process of the war’s termination.  One 
should also note that including domestic political factors into a theoretical 
understanding of war termination makes the concept of a war’s ‘stakes’ much more 
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clouded.  Therefore the following discussion of domestic political factors will focus 
on two themes: moderate – hard-liner dynamics and the stakes of the war for different 
groups within the belligerent states.  
  For the Philippine Republic, the nature of Filipino society and the divisions 
between moderates and hard-liners made the stakes of the war unclear.  In the case of 
the Philippine Republic’s dictator, the stakes were indeed high.  Emilio Aguinaldo 
had, during the revolutionary war against Spain (beginning in 1896), declared himself 
president of an independent Philippines but after losing a conventional (direct 
strategy) war had fled into exile.  His exile lasted until the US returned him to the 
Philippines during the Spanish-American War.1  Aguinaldo’s experience was that 
losing wars for independence resulted in loss of power and perhaps, exile.2    
In order to comprehend the stakes of the war for the Philippine Republic, one 
must also realize that Aguinaldo’s government was limited to the Filipino elite.3  
Furthermore, even among the elites who participated in Aguinaldo’s regime the 
stakes were not entirely clear.  Along the lines of Joe D. Hagan’s arguments, 
moderate Filipino elites in Aguinaldo’s government wanted to seek terms with the US 
while hard-liners in the Philippine Republic government opposed terms with the US 
and instead sought a strong army for the new Philippine Republic. 4  For moderates 
who were already desirous of terms with the US, the stakes of the war were likely 
                                                     
1 John M. Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags, (London: Greenwood P, Inc., 1973), 11-15; Brian M. Linn, The Philippine War, 1899-
1902, (Lawrence: Kansas UP, 2000), 18, 19. 
2 John M. Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags, “Schoolbooks,” 7-12; Brian M. Linn, The Philippine War, 15-17. 
3 Linn, “The Philippine,” 34, 35. 
4 Gates, “Schoolbooks,” 7-12; Linn, “The Philippine,” 15-17; Joe D. Hagan, “Does Decision Making Matter? Systemic 
Assumptions vs. Historical Reality in International Relations Theory.” International Studies Review 3.2(2001): 5-46.   
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lower.5  On the other hand, the stakes for the hard-liners were likely high; there would 
be little use for Filipino elites wedded to plans for a strong military if terms were 
agreed to with the US.   
Shifting the focus to the Philippines as a whole, the stakes of the war become 
even more clouded. First, in 1899 it would have been inaccurate to consider the 
Philippines as an intelligible whole.  The Philippines was geographically, ethnically, 
linguistically, and tribally diverse.  By the 1890s a national consciousness was 
forming as economic and social changes cut across the traditional pluralistic lines.  
Also, elites had been working to foster a culture built on a Filipino-Hispanic identity 
which contributed to growing Filipino nationalism.6  Despite these developments, 
Aguinaldo could claim to lead a Filipino state, but a Filipino nation with a cohesive 
Filipino national identity was yet to coalesce.7  The result is that the Filipino war 
against the US was not a war for the independence of the Filipino nation but rather a 
war for the independence of the Philippine Republic prosecuted by Aguinaldo and the 
hard-line elements of his regime with support from certain ethnic groups, notably the 
Tagalogs.8  As a consequence, the stakes of the war were not as high as they might 
                                                     
5 For example, in some areas of the Philippines, specifically in Negros where the promise of property rights under American rule 
was more appealing than joining the Philippine Republic, US occupation was requested.  See Gates, “Schoolbooks,” 78-82; 
Linn, “The Philippine,” 65-85.   
6 Gates, “Schoolbooks,” 7-12; Linn, “The Philippine,” 15-17. 
7 Gates, “Schoolbooks,” 7.  Gates describes the progress of the development towards a Filipino nation as being in a “state of 
civilization.”  The implication is that the Philippines, as a diverse and pluralistic society, was undergoing the process of 
becoming a more cohesive ‘Filipino’ society but at the time of the war, still lacked the characteristics of a nation.  The label 
‘Filipino’ could be used to describe a citizen of the Philippines but the Filipinos themselves may have self-identified as Filipino. 
8 See Gates, “Schoolbooks;” Linn, “The Philippine.” 
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ostensibly appear if one considers the Philippine-American War to truly be a Filipino 
war for national liberation. 
The stakes of the war for the US also become more convoluted once the 
influence of domestic politics enters the picture.  In US domestic politics, the role of 
moderates was played by anti-imperialists and anti-expansionist groups.  Politically, 
anti-imperialist moderates were found primarily in the Democrat Party, but some 
were also represented in the Republican Party.  For these groups, there was more to 
be gained politically from American defeat than victory.9   
Hard-liners were represented most importantly by President William 
McKinley though other pro-annexation individuals and groups (such as certain news 
presses) were also present.  As president, McKinley’s hard-line views were dominant 
in US foreign policy decision-making.  For McKinley, the US would become the 
“laughing stock of the world” if the Philippines were lost.10  Therefore, McKinley 
perceived that the stakes of the war were US prestige.  If the bargaining model did not 
assume rational unitary actors, and instead allowed for the role of individuals (and 
their perceptions), it might have been better able to identify the ‘actual’ stakes for the 
US as seen by its Commander-in-Chief.  For McKinley, the bargaining model 
classification would likely label the stakes of the war as “medium” and could perhaps 
                                                     
9 Robert C. Hilderbrand, Power and the People: Executive Management of Public Opinion in Foreign Affairs, 1897-1921.  
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 41-44. 
10 Robert C. Hilderbrand, Power and the People: Executive Management of Public Opinion in Foreign Affairs, 1897-1921, 44-
51. 
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have better accounted for the higher-than-predicted US resolve.11   Indeed, as will 
become more apparent below, McKinley’s perception that American “national credit 
and national honor” was tied to possession of the Philippines, may explain why H11 
is disconfirmed.  
The case of the Philippine-American War also reveals another group with a 
stake in the conflict.  American farmers had a tangible stake in the war.  Hemp from 
the Philippines was important to US agriculture and farmers’ concern about the hemp 
supply should not be considered trivial.  Demand for hemp by US farmers resulted in 
political pressure on McKinley that the hemp supply be secured.  This led the top US 
military officer in the Philippines, General Elwell Otis, to alter the allocation of US 
forces so that the hemp regions and ports would be secure.12  In sum, when one looks 
inside the black box, the United States’ stakes in the war become much more 
complex. 
Beyond understanding the stakes of the war, the roles played by moderates 
and hard-liners in both belligerents’ decision-making structures are important for 
comprehending the course of the war and its termination.  First, during the 
negotiations directly preceding the outbreak of the war, there was a division in 
Aguinaldo’s government between moderates seeking terms with the US and hard-
                                                     
11 Branislav L. Slantchev, “How Initiators End Their Wars: the Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace.” American Journal 
of Political Science 48.4(2004): 813-829.  
12 Linn, “The Phillipine,” 160-180.  The US efforts to secure the hemp regions and ports were generally successful despite the 
fact that the 8th Corps had not prepared plans for such a campaign.  Securing the hemp ports had another consequence in that it 
deprived the Philippine Republic of funds it managed to derive from taxes on hemp.  However, domestic forces in the US rather 
than military considerations appear as the dominant factor in the decision to secure the hemp supply. See Linn, “The Philippine,” 
174-180.  
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liners more disposed to military means in dealing with the US.  Between the two 
groups, the hard-liners had the strongest influence on Aguinaldo’s decision-making.13    
Second, in the negotiations after the April 1899 battle at Calumpit, the 
moderate – hard-line division again appeared in the Philippine Republic’s 
government.  Though the bargaining model account of these negotiations only leads 
one to consider the interaction between belligerents, the interactions within the 
Filipino government were crucial.  At the post-Calumpit negotiations, after General 
Otis rejected the Filipino counteroffer and responded with another US proposal, 
Filipino moderates were prepared to accept the US terms.  Moderates in Aguinaldo’s 
government ousted the hard-liners, and the Filipino government sent the delegates to 
further discuss surrender.  However, Aguinaldo’s top general Antonio Luna 
intercepted the Filipino peace delegates and instead sent hard-line delegates.  Luna 
then removed moderate elements from the government of Aguinaldo’s Philippine 
Republic and the reestablished hard-liner dominance.  Consequently, negotiations 
collapsed and Otis resumed the US offensive.14  In this instance, it is possible that the 
end or continuation of the Philippine-American War was contingent upon (at most 
with the aid of other hard-liners) Luna’s actions.  Though an exercise in 
counterfactual, it is conceivable that the war may have ended in late spring 1899 
rather than July of 1902 if only Luna had allowed the peace delegates to take their 
seats at the negotiating table.   
                                                     
13 Gates, “Schoolbooks,” 4-7, 16-42; Linn, “The Philippine,” 3-7, 21,34, 37-41, Ch.2. 
14 Gates, “Schoolbooks,” 92, 93, 110-112; Linn, “The Philippine,” 90-109. 
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The above examples of hard-liner dominance in the Philippine Republic’s 
decision-making confirm AH8.  Despite a series of battles in which the US inflicted 
on the Philippines a higher relative rate of losses, the hard-liners in Aguinaldo’s 
regime refused to moderate Filipino settlement terms.  Therefore, support for AH8 
explains the ostensible disconfirmation of H8.  The Filipino delegates at the post-
Calumpit negotiations were prepared to accept American terms after the Philippines’ 
terms were rejected.  However, Filipino hard-liners blocked the moderate effort to 
settle with the US.  Unfortunately, the bargaining model’s unitary actor assumption 
does not account for this type of internal dynamics.  Confirmation of AH8 may also 
offer an explanation of H6’s disconfirmation.  As H6 suggests, Filipino moderates 
were willing to accept the US offer after the Army of Liberation had suffered a series 
of defeats but Filipino hard-liners prevented an agreement.     
Another example of moderate – hard-line factionalization in the Philippine 
Republic is seen in the fall of 1899.  In spite of Luna’s purge of moderates, the 
Filipino government again became divided into peace and hard-line camps.  
Consequently, despite a string of American victories between the spring and fall of 
1899, the Philippines made only “confused efforts to resume peace negotiations” with 
the US.15   
Intra-governmental and domestic competition between moderates and hard-
liners was not limited only to the Philippine Republic.  During the autumn of 1900, 
moderates and hard-liners in the US were competing for control of the presidency.   
                                                     
15 Gates, “Schoolbooks,” 81-100; Linn, “The Philippine,” 136.   
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Moderates stood to benefit from the early success of the Filipino guerrilla war.  By 
fall of 1900, the American public had discovered that through General Otis, 
McKinley had been censoring reports from the Philippines in order to conceal US 
casualty numbers.16  Now, the knowledge of mounting casualties had begun to turn 
public opinion against a continued US presence in the Philippines.  Furthermore, 
public debate revealed that even people located between the moderate and hard-line 
poles wanted to withdraw the American soldiers.17  Making matters even worse for 
the American hard-liners, in the fall of 1900, Aguinaldo called for a pre-election 
offensive in hopes of swinging the US Presidential election to anti-imperialist 
(moderate) William Jennings Bryan.18  The shifting public opinion in the US does 
support the bargaining model’s general proposition that democratic belligerents are 
more sensitive to the costs of war.19  However, the bargaining model does not appear 
to account for these domestic dynamics. 
 Despite Filipino efforts, the knowledge of McKinley’s censorship, and the 
campaigning of anti-imperialists in the US, McKinley was reelected and a moderate 
presidential candidate was prevented from occupying the presidency.  Following the 
reelection of McKinley, the US military responded to the Filipino guerrillas with a 
                                                     
16 Hilderbrand, 48-50. 
17 Gates, “Schoolbooks,” 172, 173.  
18 Gates, “Schoolbooks,” 162, 163; Norman G. Owen, “Winding down the War in Albay, 1900-1903.”  The Pacific Historical 
Review 48.4 (1979): 557-589; Andrew J. Birtle, “The U.S. Army’s Pacification of Marinduque, Philippine Islands, April 1900-
April 1901.” The Journal of Military History 61.2 (1997): 255-282; Linn, “The Philippine,” 210.  
19 See Filson and Werner, “Bargaining and Fighting: The Impact of Regime Type on War Onset, Duration, and Outcomes.”  
American Journal of Political Science 48.2 (2004): 296-313.  
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counter-guerrilla campaign.20  The reinvigorated military effort by the US following 
McKinley’s reelection provides further confirmation of AH8.  As a hard-liner, 
McKinley was able to use his powerful position in US decision-making to continue 
the war despite the losses inflicted on the American forces by Filipino guerillas. The 
disconfirmation of H6 is also partially accounted for by McKinley’s prominent role in 
US decision-making during the war.  American public opinion may have favored 
abandoning the Philippines after the Filipino guerrilla strategy increased US 
casualties but McKinley was able to prevent any such withdrawal.  Once again one 
can see that the positioning of moderates and hard-liners in a belligerent’s 
government is important in understanding war termination.21   
A final example of the role played by the balance of influence between 
moderates and hard-liners is found during the final period of the Philippine-American 
War.  The American counter-guerrilla campaign had brought about the rapid 
disintegration of the Philippine Republic’s guerrilla forces.  The precipitous decline 
of the guerrilla threat allowed a new moderate organization, the Federal Party, to 
form.   
The rise of the moderate Federal Party may also have formed as a result of the 
American forces’ “benevolent” policies.  The benevolent policies including 
sanitation, vaccination, provision of educational opportunities, allowance of local 
self-government, anti-corruption reforms and road building signaled the Filipino 
                                                     
20 Gates, “Schoolbooks,” 173-175;  Hilderbrand, 48-51; Linn, “The Philippine,” 213-215. 
21 See Joe D. Hagan, “Does Decision Making Matter? Systemic Assumptions vs. Historical Reality in International Relations 
Theory.”  
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populace that acceptance of US sovereignty over the Philippines would likely have 
some positive implications.22  Also, the US military made it a point to punish 
American soldiers for abuses against Filipinos in order to dispel Philippine Republic 
propaganda which demonized the US forces.23  In contrast to American policies of 
benevolence, abuses such as robberies, murders, and rapes by the Philippine army led 
some Filipinos to oppose Aguinaldo’s regime.24  Therefore it is possible that in 
addition to reducing the influence of the hard-liners through military means, the US 
also took actions to increase the numbers and influence of moderates in Filipino 
domestic politics.  
Using its powerful membership (150,000 members) and widespread support, 
the Federal Party called for recognition of US sovereignty over the Philippines and 
urged the leaders of the Filipino resistance to surrender.25  The shift in popular 
support in favor of accepting US sovereignty, the actions of the Federal Party, and the 
promise of benevolent treatment for peaceable Filipinos all worked to bring about the 
increasingly successful negotiations for the surrender of guerrilla units and leaders.26  
Notably, the success of the Federal Party and the increasing number of surrenders 
both occurred prior to Aguinaldo’s capture.  Thus, the actions of Filipino moderates 
and the consequences of those actions lend some support to AH7.  As moderates 
came to wield influence in the Philippines (politically, if not directly in decision-
                                                     
22 Gates, “Schoolbooks,” 55-70, 81-100, 128-149, 214, 215. 
23 Ibid., 83. 
24 Ibid., 92, 93. 
25 Gates, “Schoolbooks,” 218-220, 229; Linn; 215, 216. 
26 Gates, “Schoolbooks,” 218, 219, 229, 230, 233-235; Linn; “The Philippine,” 215-224, Ch. 10-13.  
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making), the Philippines moderated and moved closer to accepting the United States’ 
settlement terms.  In sum, one can see in the processes of war and war termination the 
important roles played by moderates and hard-liners in both domestic politics and 
decision-making. 
Constructivism/Critical Theory 
 Though the constructivist hypothesis (AH1) is disconfirmed, critical theory 
may add an important insight into the disconfirmation of bargaining model 
hypotheses H11 and H14.  First, AH1 predicts that the violent interactions between 
the Philippine Republic and the US would lead both belligerents to demand more 
concessions from each other as the duration of the war increased.  This hypothesis is 
disconfirmed by the Philippine-American War.  Not only did the Philippines 
eventually accept the American settlement terms, but also the US did not increase its 
demands on the Philippines even after it had achieved the nearly complete defeat of 
the Filipino forces.  Therefore, in this instance, constructivism does not offer a better 
understanding of the Philippine-American War. 
 However, the case study does confirm critical theory’s prediction that the 
leaders of a belligerent state will rally public support by exploiting dichotomous 
images of the state as opposed to the adversary (AO1).  In the case of the US, Robert 
C. Hilderbrand argues that President William McKinley influenced American public 
opinion in order to gain support for the war in the Philippines.  President McKinley 
used a close relationship with key news sources to present a message to the American 
public that the US was the “world’s best civilization” and “rescuer” of the 
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Philippines.27  From what the US was rescuing the Philippines, McKinley argued, 
was “savage indolence and habits.”28  McKinley contrasted the humanitarian 
purposes of the US occupation with the Philippine Republic’s dictator Emilio 
Aguinaldo and other “cruel leaders.”  Hilderbrand argues that through tailored 
rhetoric and a strong relationship with the press, McKinley was able to maintain 
public support for the war.  Particularly strong evidence for the effect of McKinley’s 
use of discourse is found in the warm response and popular support that McKinley’s 
policy toward the Philippines received in the heavily Democrat American South.29 
 While McKinley’s use of dichotomous images to foster public support for the 
war against the Philippine Republic clearly supports AO1, it may also offer some 
explanation for the disconfirmation of H11 and H14.  The success of the president in 
gaining public support may explain why the US, a democracy fighting a low stakes 
war, refused to further moderate or abandon its settlement terms even when facing a 
higher relative rate of losses during the early guerrilla war period. 
 Whether the Philippine Republic utilized dichotomous images to gain mass 
support is unclear.  The evidence does indicate that Aguinaldo’s government waged a 
propaganda campaign against the US.30  However, what is known about the content 
of this campaign or its effects does not provide enough evidence for the testing of 
AO1. 
Political Psychology Approaches 
                                                     
27 Hilderbrand, 44, 45. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 42-51. 
30 Gates, “Schoolbooks,” 83. 
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 The alternative hypotheses and expected observations derived from political 
psychology approaches find a mix of confirmation and disconfirmation.   However, 
the confirmed hypotheses and expectations help in furthering an understanding of the 
challenges to the bargaining model.  To begin, AH2 predicts that, as a consequence of 
attribution errors, neither the US nor the Philippine Republic would moderate its 
settlement terms if the other exhibited resolve (either by refusing to decrease demands 
or increase concessions) in negotiations.  AH2 is a direct challenge to H8’s prediction 
that bargaining behavior in negotiations will influence belligerents’ settlement terms.  
Evidence from the only instance of formal negotiations during the war disconfirms 
AH2.  At the negotiations following the battle at Calumpit, the US top military 
official slightly moderated American settlement terms after the initial US proposal 
was rejected.  Then, after receiving the US counteroffer that (though moderated) 
retained a demand for the acceptance of American sovereignty over the Philippines, 
the Filipino delegation relented in the face of US resolve and accepted the settlement 
terms. 31  However, one should note that disconfirmation of AH2 is only possible by 
dropping the unitary actor assumption and examining the internal decision-making of 
the Philippine Republic.   
 The predictions of political psychology about decision-makers’ use of 
historical analogies and past lessons are better supported.  Though neither the Filipino 
or American military leaders or decision-makers specifically referenced historical 
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analogies to the war in the Philippines, US strategy in the war clearly appears to have 
been guided by the lessons of previous military successes.   
The American military leaders drew on pacification doctrine developed during 
the Civil and Indian Wars.  This doctrine (especially General Order 100) called for 
benevolence to peaceful segments of an occupied territory but harsh treatment for 
hostile groups and individuals.  Frontier fighting and the Indian Wars also bequeathed 
to the Regulars efficient small-unit tactics well suited to irregular war.32  The use of 
past experiences supports AO2.  The lessons drawn from previous pacification 
campaigns were quite successful throughout the anti-guerrilla campaign in the 
Philippines and therefore do not permit testing of AH3.33 
This case provides no direct evidence with which to test AH4’s prediction 
based on the wishful thinking bias. In regard to AO3, there is insufficient evidence to 
clearly support or challenge the prediction that military organizations will 
overestimate the probability of military success. On one hand, the surrender of one 
Filipino general poses a challenge for the wishful thinking bias underlying AO3.  
Brian Linn states that in December of 1899 (well before the end of the war in 1902), 
Filipino General Daniel Tirona, “decided resistance was futile.” Recognizing the 
futility of continued fighting, Tirona “surrendered 1,200 precious rifles and all the 
                                                     
32 Linn, “The Philippine,” 8-12. 
33 Alternative hypothesis three (AH3) states that if a belligerent’s decision-makers and/or military leaders employ inappropriate 
historical analogies in the formation of strategy during war, then ceteris paribus the belligerent will suffer higher rates of losses 
than its opponent.  Please see Chapter 2 for a discussion of the potential problem of circular reasoning inherent in AH3.  For 
details on the success of the US counter-guerrilla strategy see Gates, “Schoolbooks,” 110-112, 144-148, 187-211, Ch. 7; Birtle, 
255-282; Brian M. Linn, “Provincial Pacification in the Philippines, 1900-1901: The First District Department of Northern 
Luzon.” Military Affairs 51.2 (1987): 62-66.; Linn, “The Philippine,” 136-159, 197-224, 235, Ch. 10-13.   
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forces in Isabella and Cagayan Provinces.”34  While only a single example, Tirona’s 
early surrender suggests that he did not overestimate the probability of Filipino 
military success.  On the other hand, after the Battle of Manila and a string of 
battlefield defeats inflicted by the US,35  General Antonio Luna remarked, “Our 
enemies are too strong and superior in means.”36  Yet, it was Luna who after further 
Filipino defeats (including the loss at Calumpit) prevented the moderate delegates 
from reaching a peace agreement with the US, thereby leading to a resumption of 
battle. 
 The remaining hypotheses and expected observation drawn from prospect 
theory are confirmed and offer yet further explanation for the disconfirmation of H11 
and H14.  Moreover, the confirmation for prospect theory may explain why the 
evidence is so unclear regarding AO3.  First, AH5 is confirmed in regard to both the 
Philippine Republic and the US but an important caveat must be noted.  AH5 predicts 
that if either Filipino or American decision-makers framed the war as an effort to 
avoid losses, then the decision-makers would refuse to moderate settlement terms 
even if facing outright military defeat in continued battle.  The domestic politics 
perspective has shown that for most of the war, hard-liners were the dominant 
decision-makers in both belligerents. Thus, one must understand how hard-liners in 
the Philippine Republic and US framed the war.  The historical sources used provide 
no evidence in the form of statements by hard-line Filipino leaders that they framed 
                                                     
34 Gates, “Schoolbooks,” 110-112, 144-148; Linn, “The Philippine,” 154.  
35 Gates, “Schoolbooks,” 79; Linn, “The Philippine,” 55-64. 
36 Linn, “The Philippine,” 61-63. 
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the war as an effort to avoid losses.  However, one may reasonably assume that the 
Filipino hard-liners perceived the war as just such an effort.  If explored, this may 
provide a psychological mechanism underlying the high resolve of the hard-liners in 
the Filipino government.   
For the US, the evidence is clear that President McKinley framed the war not 
as the pursuit of gains but rather a fight to keep its recent colonial acquisition.  
Moreover, McKinley framed any potential loss of the Philippines as a concomitant 
loss of US prestige.37  In this light, the disconfirmation of H11 and H14 may be 
explainable from another perspective.  Perhaps McKinley’s framing of the war for the 
Philippines as an effort to avoid losses explains the higher-than-predicted resolve 
exhibited by the US. McKinley’s framing of the war also confirms AO4.  The 
President quickly renormalized on a new status quo that included the recently gained 
Philippines and perceived any potential loss of the Philippines not as a diminished 
gain but as an absolute loss.38 
The confirmation of prospect theory’s hypothesis (AH5) may also help 
explain the lack of clear evidence regarding the wishful thinking bias under-girding 
AO3.  The actions of the US may have allowed some Filipino soldiers and even high-
ranking officers to frame acceptance of US settlement terms as something other than 
a loss.  For example, the US forces offered pardons, amnesty, and money for 
surrendered arms as conciliation to Filipino soldiers and officers who capitulated.39   
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A more striking example of the US conciliation policy is General Daniel Tirona’s 
surrender.  General Tirona was willing to surrender to the US not only because he 
viewed continued fighting to be futile, but also because the US was willing to appoint 
him governor of the same area he had previously controlled as a general officer in the 
Filipino military.40  Therefore, Tirona may have been able to frame surrender to the 
US as resulting in a gain (which might support AH6).  By explaining this aspect of 
Tirona’s surrender, it becomes possible to understand his actions without reference to 
the wishful thinking bias.  Additionally, the conciliation offered to other Filipino 
soldiers and officers may explain their surrenders as well. 
Organization Theory 
  Organization theory presents an alternative hypothesis (AH10) and an 
alternative expected observation (AO5) applicable to the Philippine-American War.41  
AO5 is supported by the premature view of US officials that the war was over by the 
final months of 1899.  At that time, American officials in the Philippines were 
convinced that the “war had ended in an American victory.” General Otis informed 
the US government that the “claim to government by insurgents can be made no 
longer under any fiction.” Among Otis’ subordinates, General Arthur MacArthur 
remarked that the Philippine military presented “no organized insurgent force left to 
strike at.” Furthermore, some official US proclamations in the Philippines declared 
                                                     
40 Gates, “Schoolbooks,” 144-149, 217, 218; Linn, “The Philippine,” 154. 
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the war to be over. 42  However, what US leaders had perceived as the end of the war 
was actually just a shift in tactics from conventional to guerrilla warfare.43 
This mistaken belief that the war was over, and that the Filipino forces had 
been definitively beaten, offers support for AO5’s prediction that different 
belligerents will view the same battle outcomes differently.  Following an overall 
successful battle to prevent the adoption of guerrilla warfare by the Filipino military, 
what the US believed to be the end of the war was actually the transition period 
during which the Filipino forces switched from conventional to guerrilla warfare.  It 
should be noted that the military outcome of the US fall offensive was a defeat for the 
Philippines.  The caveat is that the US perceived it to be the defeat of the Philippines 
whereas for the Filipinos, the offensive resulted in only a defeat.44 
 The support for AO5 may point out additional problems with the rational-
choice assumptions of the bargaining model, but the confirmation found for AH10 is 
more crucial to an understanding of the Philippine-American War.  AH10 predicts 
that a belligerent’s settlement terms will not be moderated if top military leaders 
oppose moderation.  Confirmation of this hypothesis is found in the post-Calumpit 
negotiations. During the negotiation process, the Philippine Republic’s top general, 
Luna, preempted the moderates’ attempt to accept the US settlement terms and 
instead substituted hard-line delegates. This is perhaps an extreme example of a top 
military leader’s influence on decision-making, but it clearly demonstrates the 
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powerful role that such leaders may play.  The support for AH10 offers still another 
explanation for the disconfirmation of H6.  Luna preferred to continue fighting 
despite the higher rate of losses suffered by the Army of Liberation relative to US 
forces.  As a consequence of his influence, the Filipino regime rejected the US 
settlement offer.  For a summary of the findings regarding the alternative 
hypotheses/expected observations, please see Table 4 in the Appendix. 
Analysis 
An appraisal of the alternative hypotheses and expected observations 
In the case of the Philippine-American War, the pertinent alternative 
hypotheses/expected observations find confirmation at a higher rate than the 
bargaining model hypotheses and expected observations.  Only two hypotheses, AH1 
and AH2 are found to be disconfirmed.  Of the ten remaining alternative 
hypotheses/expected observations, seven are confirmed and the other three are not 
testable due to insufficient evidence.  In sum, seven of nine tested alternative 
hypotheses/expected observations are confirmed. 
The evidence supporting the alternative perspectives provided by 
constructivism, critical theory, political psychology, domestic politics, and 
organization theory clearly sheds light on the bargaining model’s weaknesses.  The 
most glaring of these weaknesses appears to be the bargaining model’s unitary 
rational actor assumption which obscures within a black box the internal dynamics 
and bounded rationality of decision-making.  In the case of the Philippine-American 
War, internal decision-making dynamics are shown to be too important to ignore. 
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However, the alternative perspectives discussed in this chapter are only used 
to point out gaps and weaknesses in the bargaining model and do not offer a single 
coherent account of the war.  Nevertheless, the evidence does suggest that the 
hypotheses regarding the roles of top military leaders (AH10) and moderates/hard-
liners (AH7 and AH8) have the most explanatory power.  Other variables (and related 
alternative hypotheses/expected observations) appear to enter into the causal 
pathways largely via top military leaders, hard-liners, and moderates.  For example, 
McKinley, a hard-liner and top US decision-maker, framed the war an effort to avoid 
losing (see AH5 and AO4) both the Philippines and American prestige.  McKinley 
then used dichotomous images of the US as ‘civilized’ and the Philippines as ‘savage’ 
(see AO2) in order to rally public support for the war.  Thus, the case of the 
Philippine-American War suggests that a further understanding of top military 
leaders, hard-liners, and moderates – and the factors that affect their behavior – is 
necessary for understanding war termination decisions and outcomes.   
The findings in this chapter clearly challenge the bargaining model of war 
termination.  However, the state of the bargaining model must be examined in light of 
the support found for the alternative perspectives.  In the next and final chapter, I 
discuss what implications for the bargaining model arise from the alternative 
perspectives considered above.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusions and Implications for the Bargaining Model 
The evidence presented in the previous chapter generally supports the 
alternative perspectives and casts doubt on the bargaining model and its assumptions.  
Primarily, the bargaining model’s unitary rational actor assumption is shown to be 
problematic.  First, the unitary actor assumption misses the presence of actors with 
different preferences over war and wartime options. In both belligerents, there were 
moderates who likely would have produced different outcomes had they been able to 
more strongly influence foreign policy decision-making.  Moderates in both 
belligerents preferred a peace agreement and cessation of fighting to continued war in 
the defense of demands and settlement terms.  However, for the bulk of the war, 
Filipino and American decision-making was dominated by hard-liners who preferred 
continued war over moderation of settlement terms.   
The presence of hard-liners and moderates suggests a need for revision of the 
bargaining model’s hypotheses regarding regime type (H9-H11) and the stakes of a 
war (H12-H14).  In line with Joe D. Hagan’s arguments, a belligerent’s regime type 
seems to be less important in determining resolve than the positioning of moderates 
and hard-liners within its decision-making apparatus.1  Also, the stakes of a war may 
depend on whether hard-liners or moderates are at the helm of decision-making 
structures when the potential or actual outbreak of war confronts a state.  The 
disconfirmation of H11 and H14 shows the benefits of considering the US not as a 
democracy engaged in a low stakes war, but as a belligerent in which decision-
                                                     
1
 
Joe D. Hagan, “Does Decision Making Matter? Systemic Assumptions vs. Historical Reality in International Relations 
Theory.” International Studies Review 3.2(2001): 5-46.  
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making was dominated by a hard-liner who viewed more to be at stake in the war 
than the bargaining model predicted.2  The case further suggests that moderate and 
hard-liner competition in domestic politics may affect the relative influence of 
moderates and hard-liners in decision-making.  For example, the 1900 US election 
had the potential of replacing a hard-line president with a moderate.   
Perhaps of equal importance, the confirmation of H9 and H12 should be 
reconsidered.  The Philippine Republic, while led by a mixed authoritarian regime 
fighting for its continued rule, looks very different when examined from the vantage 
point of organization theory and domestic politics approaches.  Had moderates held 
sway over Aguinaldo during the prewar negotiations, or had Luna (both a hard-liner 
and the Philippines’ top general) not intercepted the Filipino peace delegates during 
the post-Calumpit negotiations, the Philippine Republic would likely not have 
exhibited the high resolve predicted by H9 and H12.  That the Philippine Republic 
did exhibit such resolve should not be taken as confirmation of those hypotheses.  
The Philippine Republic’s decision-making was far too contingent on the actions of 
(sometimes a very few) hard-liners and the military leadership for its war time policy 
to be accepted at face value.   
Having reconsidered the confirmation of H9 and H12, it is important to 
consider the implications for H6 and H8.  The bargaining model explains away the 
disconfirming actions of the Philippine Republic by pointing to the effects of regime 
type and the stakes of the war.  Yet, this explanation becomes impoverished when one 
                                                     
2 See Branislav L. Slantchev, “How Initiators End Their Wars: the Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace.” American 
Journal of Political Science 48.4(2004): 813-829, see especially 819. 
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is able to see the conflict between Filipino moderates and hard-liners during the post-
Calumpit negotiations.  Thus, the role of belief updating, as a result of battle and 
negotiation, must be reconsidered.   
 Examining the decision-making dynamics and domestic politics of the 
belligerents also provides a second category of insights.  By incorporating the role of 
domestic politics, decision-makers and other individual actors, one may apply 
political psychology to war termination decision.  Political psychology permits 
consideration of the role that biases and perceptions play in war termination decision-
making.  Though the evidence is inconclusive regarding the wishful thinking bias, 
support is found for prospect theory’s predictions.   
In particular, the role of framing demonstrates the variables missed by the 
bargaining model’s assumptions of unitary and rational belligerents.  The Philippine 
Republic’s hard-liners presumably framed the war as an effort to avoid losses and 
McKinley certainly used such frames in his characterization of the war.  Perhaps most 
critical in this case, McKinley’s framing of the war raised the stakes above the level 
assigned by the bargaining model.   Framing effects suggest that it matters not just 
over what a war is fought, but also whether a belligerent’s decision-makers frame the 
war aims as achievement of gains or avoidance of losses.  For example, decision-
makers in a belligerent fighting to gain a colonial possession may indeed exhibit low 
resolve.  However, decision-makers in a belligerent fighting to hold a colony may be 
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expected to exhibit high resolve.  In short, McKinley’s framing may explain why US 
actions disconfirmed bargaining model hypotheses H6, H11, and H14.3   
Framing is also important in another sense.  As critical theory predicted, 
McKinley rallied public support by exploiting a dichotomous image of a ‘civilized’ 
US rescuing the Filipino ‘savage.’  This frame seems to have been effective in 
gaining public support for the war and may offer still another reason that US resolve 
exceeded that predicted by H11 and H14. 
Given the above case study and discussion, what can be said of the bargaining 
model?  In short, the bargaining model needs significant revision.  Of the eleven 
bargaining model hypotheses tested in the first section of this chapter, only H1, H2, 
H3, and H5 have remained unchallenged by the alternative explanations and 
empirical evidence.  Furthermore, H1 does not emerge unquestioned when 
scrutinized through the lenses of the alternative theories/approaches.  Consider what 
might have happened had anti-imperialist William Jennings Bryan defeated William 
McKinley in the 1900 US presidential election.  Though counterfactual, it is possible 
that the US would have relented in the Philippines despite the fact that America 
would still have possessed superior reserves.  Thus, only the confirmation of H2, H3, 
and H5 remains undisputed.  Notably, the focus of these three hypotheses is limited to 
the effect of military strategies on battle outcomes.  Therefore, their unquestioned 
confirmation is not a critical vindication of the model.  
                                                     
3 However, one should keep in mind the above discussion of H6. 
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Yet, findings from this thesis do not warrant discarding the bargaining model.  
In the first place, the conclusions drawn from a single war can be no more than 
tentative.  However, given the multiple observations and perspectives provided in this 
study, the Philippine-American War may be seen not as one case but as a number of 
cases within a larger episode. Therefore, the challenges to the bargaining model found 
in this study should also not be understated.  Still, despite Alexander L. George and 
Andrew Bennett’s claims that inference from a single case is possible, the bargaining 
model is not wholly discredited by this thesis’ examination of the Philippine-
American War. 4   Perhaps the bargaining model is not suited to wars in which one or 
both belligerents are led by a recently formed regime.  Or, the bargaining model may 
be less applicable to wars that might be classified as counterinsurgencies (as the 
Philippine-American War might be labeled).  Still another possibility is that the 
Philippine-American war is simply an outlier.  Additional research will be needed to 
further scrutinize the bargaining model and alternative perspectives. 
The limitations of a single case study are not the only reasons to caution 
against abandoning the bargaining model.  After all, the most basic expectations of 
the bargaining model – intra-war negotiation (O1) and settlement term endogeneity 
(O2) – remain confirmed.   Despite the warnings of political psychology (see AH2), 
attribution errors do not seem to preclude the informational role of negotiations 
during war.  Furthermore, other factors such as differing perceptions of battle 
                                                     
4 Andrew Bennet and Alexander L. George, “Case Studies in Process Tracing in History and Political Science: Similar Strokes 
for Different Foci.” in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman eds., Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists and 
the Study of International Relations, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001); Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies 
and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), see 28-30. 
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outcomes or decision-makers’ use of historical analogies do not apparently present 
insurmountable impediments to belief updating based on battlefield information.5  
Thus, modeling war as a bargaining process is not necessarily inappropriate.  
Drawing on the lessons of this case, it appears that most of the bargaining model’s 
shortcomings may be resolved by discarding the unitary rational actor assumption.    
Taking into account the roles played by domestic politics and decision-makers in the 
bargaining process may allow insight into the social and psychological factors that 
delineate the possibilities and limits of bargaining. 
Again, further research is clearly needed in order to determine whether the 
findings of this thesis are only exceptions to the bargaining model.  In future work, I 
plan to examine wars from different periods in the modern era as well as wars with 
different combinations of regime types, points of conflict, and balances of military 
capabilities between belligerents.  I also intend to research wars in which intra-
belligerent shifts occurred with regard to the relative influence of moderates and hard-
liners at the levels of domestic politics and decision-making.   
The findings of this thesis have strongly suggested that answers to two 
questions may be important for explaining war termination.  Do the beliefs of 
moderates or hard-liners change as a result of information received in negotiation and 
battle?  Or, does the balance of influence between moderates and hard-liners shift as a 
result of battle and/or negotiation outcomes?  By scrutinizing domestic politics 
                                                     
5 For example, despite believing that the war was over, once the Filipino guerrilla campaign began inflicting heavy losses, the 
US was able to recognize and successfully counter the new Filipino strategy.  See Gates, “Schoolbooks,” 110-210; Linn, “The 
Philippine,” 139-235, Ch. 10-13. 
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variables and the social and psychological contexts of wartime decision-making, 
progress may be made in war termination theory.  Given the basic finding that 
negotiations do occur and that settlement terms have at least some measure of 
endogeneity, it is possible that through further research, the bargaining model will be 
improved by the alternative perspectives that have so clearly challenged it in this 
thesis.       
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Appendix 
Table 1: Bargaining Model Hypotheses 
Material Hypotheses 
H1: if belligerent A has more reserves than belligerent B, then ceteris paribus belligerent A will 
demand more favorable settlement terms than belligerent B. 
 
H2: if the stronger belligerent employs a direct strategy against a weaker belligerent also employing a 
direct strategy, then the weaker belligerent will suffer higher relative rates of loss in battle. 
 
H3: if the stronger belligerent employs a direct strategy against a weaker belligerent employing an 
indirect strategy, then the stronger belligerent will suffer higher relative rates of loss in battle.  
 
H4: if the stronger belligerent employs an indirect strategy against a weaker belligerent employing a 
direct strategy, then the stronger belligerent will suffer higher relative rates of loss in battle. 
 
H5: if the stronger belligerent employs an indirect strategy against a weaker belligerent also 
employing an indirect strategy, then the weaker belligerent will suffer higher relative rates of loss in 
battle. 
 
H6: if belligerent A suffers losses at a greater rate than belligerent B, then ceteris paribus belligerent 
A will moderate its settlement terms.   
 
H7: if belligerent A suffers losses at a lesser rate than belligerent B, then ceteris paribus belligerent A 
will not moderate its settlement terms.  
 
Negotiation Effects Hypothesis 
H8: if belligerent A refuses to moderate its settlement terms, then ceteris paribus belligerent B will 
moderate its settlement terms. 
 
Regime Hypotheses 
H9: if a belligerent is led by a mixed authoritarian regime, then it will refuse to moderate its settlement 
terms even if it faces outright military defeat in continued battle. 
 
H10: if a belligerent is led by a dictatorial regime, then it will moderate its settlement terms when 
experiencing a higher rate of losses in battle than its adversary.   
 
H11: if a belligerent is led by a democratic regime, then it will moderate its settlement terms when 
experiencing a higher rate of losses in battle than its adversary. 
 
Stakes Hypotheses 
H12: if the stakes of a war are high, then ceteris paribus a belligerent will refuse to moderate its 
settlement terms even if it faces outright military defeat in continued battle. 
 
H13: if the stakes of a war are medium, then ceteris paribus a belligerent will moderate its settlement 
terms when incurring greater rates of losses than its adversary but will persist in war in order to 
achieve some of its aims. 
 
H14: if the stakes of a war are low, then ceteris paribus a belligerent will dramatically moderate or 
forsake its settlement terms when experiencing a higher rate of losses in battle than its adversary. 
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Table 2: Alternative Hypotheses and Expected Observations 
Constructivism/Critical Theory 
AH1: as the duration of a war increases, then ceteris paribus the more concessions in the settlement 
terms a belligerent will demand from its opponent. 
 
AO1: a belligerent’s leader will rally public support by exploiting dichotomous images of the state as 
opposed to the adversary. 
 
Psychological Theory 
AH2: if belligerent A refuses to moderate its settlement terms, then ceteris paribus belligerent B will 
not moderate its settlement terms. 
  
AH3: if decision-makers and/or military leaders employ inappropriate historical analogies to form 
strategy, then ceteris paribus the belligerent will suffer higher rates of losses than its opponent. 
 
AH4: states that if a belligerent’s decision-makers suffer from the wishful thinking bias, then the 
decision-makers will refuse to moderate settlement terms even if facing outright military defeat in 
continued battle.  
 
AH5: if a belligerent’s decision-makers frame the war as an effort to avoid losses, then the decision-
makers will refuse to moderate settlement terms even if facing outright military defeat in continued 
battle. 
 
AH6: if a belligerent’s decision-makers frame the war as an effort to achieve gains, then the decision-
makers will moderate settlement terms when experiencing a higher rate of losses in battle than its 
adversary. 
 
AO2: decision-makers will use historical analogies as heuristic aids in policy formation. 
 
AO3: military organizations will distort battlefield information by overestimating the probability of 
military success. 
 
AO4: for a belligerent, any reversal that results in a loss of recent gains will be perceived as an 
absolute loss. 
 
Domestic Politics/Organization Theory 
AH7: if moderates dominate a belligerent’s decision-making apparatus, then the belligerent will 
moderate its settlement terms.   
 
AH8: if hard-liners dominate a belligerent’s decision-making apparatus, then the belligerent will 
refuse to moderate its settlement terms even if it faces outright military defeat in continued battle. 
 
AH9: if a belligerent’s chief military leaders support moderating settlement terms, then settlement 
terms will be moderated.   
 
AH10: if a belligerent’s chief military leaders oppose moderating settlement terms, then settlement 
terms will not be moderated. 
 
AO5: different belligerents and separate bureaucracies within each belligerent’s government will use 
unique measures of success and failure and therefore view the same outcome differently. 
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Table 3: Assessment of 
Hypotheses/Expected 
Observations Tested in the 
Philippine-American War 
 
Expected Observation 1 
 
Expected Observation 2 
 
Material Hypotheses 
 
Hypothesis 1 
 
Hypothesis 2 
 
Hypothesis 3       
 
Hypothesis 5 
 
Hypothesis 6 
 
Hypothesis 7 
 
Negotiation Effects Hypothesis 
 
Hypothesis 8 
 
Regime Hypotheses 
 
Hypothesis 9 
 
Hypothesis 11 
 
Expected Observation 3 
 
Stakes Hypotheses 
 
Hypothesis 12 
 
Hypothesis 14 
Confirmed 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
Mixed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Disconfirmed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
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Table 4: Alternative 
Hypotheses/Expected 
Observations Tested in the 
Philippine-American War 
 
Constructivism/Critical Theory  
 
Alternative Hypothesis 1 
 
Alternative Expected Observation 1 
 
Political Psychology 
 
Alternative Hypothesis 2 
 
Alternative Hypothesis 4 
 
Alternative Hypothesis 5 
 
Alternative Hypothesis 6 
 
Alternative Expected Observation 2 
 
Alternative Expected Observation 3 
 
Alternative Expected Observation 4 
 
Domestic Politics/Decision-Making 
 
Alternative Hypothesis 7 
 
Organization Theory 
 
Alternative Hypothesis 10 
 
Alternative Expected Observation 5 
 
Confirmed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
Mixed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dis-
confirmed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
Insufficient 
Evidence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
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